The Global Blueprint

Prospectus for Scotland's Foreign Policy Institutions under Independence

ANTHONY SALAMONE

EUROPEAN MERCHANTS
— EDINBURGH —

Scottish
Statebuilder
Project

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Purveyors of Political Insight

European Merchants is the Scottish political analysis firm based in Edinburgh and led by Anthony Salamone

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Anthony Salamone FRSA is the Founder and Managing Director of European Merchants, the Scottish political analysis firm in Edinburgh. He is one of Scotland's leading political analysts. A political scientist, he is equipped with over ten years of experience in Scottish, European and international affairs. His primary fields of expertise rest in EU politics and institutions, Scottish politics, British politics and international relations. Anthony is an authority on Scotland's European and external relations, Scottish paradiplomacy and soft power, and the politics of Scottish independence on Europe and international affairs. He has further expertise in US politics, US foreign policy, transatlantic relations, European small states and modern diplomatic strategy. Anthony has degrees from the University of Edinburgh and the London School of Economics and Political Science. Among his past positions, he was Founding Managing Editor of *European Futures*, the University of Edinburgh's academic blog on European affairs; Steering Group Member of the Edinburgh Europa Institute; Co-Convenor of the Edinburgh Europa Research Group; Founding President of the Edinburgh University European Union Society; Creator and Lead Educator of *Towards Brexit? The UK's EU Referendum*, the University of Edinburgh-FutureLearn Massive Open Online Course; and Assistant Editor of the *LSE European Politics and Policy* (EUROPP) blog. Anthony is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, a Member of the Edinburgh Europa Institute and the President Emeritus of the Edinburgh University European Union Society. He has a strong commitment to discussion of European and international issues and he is a regular contributor to public debate.

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Introduction

1. One of the principal defining features of a state is how it relates to the outside world. Foreign policy is the means to represent the state articulately and effectively. It is the vehicle for upholding values, advancing interests and driving progress.

2. European and international relations are integral aspects of Scotland's independence debate. Given the succession of opinion polls showing majority support for statehood among decided voters, the conversation has assumed a new character.

3. However, we must be forthright – our public discourse on the EU and on foreign policy is circular, shallow and insufficient. It is time to enhance the quality of the debate.

4. This Blueprint provides a prospectus for Scotland's foreign policy institutions, should independence take place. It is not a report about whether Scotland should become independent, but rather a rigorous assessment of the structures required to build a successful Scottish foreign policy, should the people choose that option.

5. This report is focused on institutions and does not set out foreign policy positions on particular issues. Nevertheless, it is based on the premises that Scotland will become a member of the European Union; Scotland will be an ardent advocate of the United Nations and multilateralism; and Scotland will adopt a values-based foreign policy.

6. Throughout its chapters, the Blueprint presents a comprehensive and credible vision for the foreign policy architecture of an independent Scottish state. It starts with the principles and institutions that should underpin Scotland's foreign policy, and moves to the design of the new Department of European and External Relations.

7. The report then considers the role of foreign policy in EU membership, participation in multilateral organisations, creating a Scottish network of diplomatic missions and establishing bilateral relations with other states of the world.

8. It then outlines the systems and agencies which will support Scotland's foreign policy action, followed by management of domestic diplomacy and crafting a holistic foreign policy integrating sectoral interests. The report concludes with a preliminary analysis of Scottish diplomatic strategy for the modern world.

9. This Blueprint conceptualises Scottish diplomacy under independence in a new level of detail. The report takes inspiration from Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Norway. It is the second in the European Merchants Scotland Blueprint series, after *Scotland's EU Blueprint*, which is pioneering a more substantive discussion on independence.

10. Our public debate will benefit from greater reflection on EU and international affairs.

Anthony Salamone **FRSA**

12 February 2021

1. Principles and Institutions

11. Foreign policy does not exist in isolation. It is a reflection of the state and its domestic practice. As a European small state, Scotland's foreign policy must be grounded in its values and interests, supported by robust institutions to secure them. The distinction between European relations and external relations must be fully internalised. As an EU Member State, the Union will become an integral part of Scotland's constitutional order. Establishing a Scottish state will be a rare opportunity to define our global role.

12. This Chapter presents the **State Institutions of Scotland**, the **Principles and Values** defining its foreign policy, the **Department of European and External Relations**, the **Civil Service**, **Interinstitutional Relations** and the **Transition to Independence**.

1A. State Institutions

13. The Blueprint is based on a scenario for the governance of Scotland that represents a reasonable imagination of the institutions of the prospective Scottish state.

14. In practice, the system of governance of the state will result from substantial debate and reflection. Such matters will be decided by the people directly through elections and referendums, and indirectly through their elected representatives.

15. For the purposes of defining its foreign policy architecture, the Blueprint presumes that the governance of Scotland is organised as follows.

16. Upon independence, Scotland becomes a constitutional republic.

17. The formal name of the state is the **Republic of Scotland** (Poblachd na h-Alba). The short name of the state is **Scotland** (Alba).

18. The institutions of government, the functions of the state and the rights of individuals are established in the **Constitution of the Republic**. Its contents and amendments are approved by the people.

19. The Constitution creates four Principal Institutions of the State: the Parliament of Scotland, Government of Scotland, President of Scotland and Judiciary of Scotland.

20. The Parliament of Scotland is the legislative branch of the state. The current Scottish Parliament is renamed the **Parliament of Scotland** (Pàrlamaid na h-Alba).

21. The Government of Scotland the executive branch of the state. The current Scottish Government is renamed the **Government of Scotland** (Riaghaltas na h-Alba).

22. The Head of State is the **President of Scotland** (Ceann-suidhe na h-Alba), also called the President of the Republic. The President is directly elected by the people.

23. The Head of Government is the **Prime Minister of Scotland** (Prìomhaire na h-Alba). The Prime Minister and the Government derive their mandate from the Parliament.

24. The leader of the Parliament is the **Convener of the Parliament of Scotland** (Neach-gairm Pàrlamaid na h-Alba).

25. The status of English, Gaelic, Scots or other languages in the institutions of the state will be determined by the people and may be subject of provisions in the Constitution. The Blueprint assumes that English and Gaelic are **State Languages of Scotland**.

26. The armed services of the state are the **Scottish Republic Defence Forces** (SRDF).

27. The division of the Government supporting the Prime Minister in exercising their functions is the **Department of the Prime Minister**.

28. The Blueprint presumes that Scotland's aspiration is to be a progressive, European republic, invested in the European Union and committed to multilateralism.

29. Accordingly, Scotland becomes a Member State of the European Union in the period after independence. The Republic is a positive and constructive member of the Union.

30. This Blueprint expands on concepts first presented in *The EU Blueprint: Pathway for Scotland's Accession to the European Union under Independence*, written by Anthony Salamone and published by European Merchants – and referenced as *Scotland's EU Blueprint*.[1] The two Blueprints should be read in companion.

31. The Blueprint does not include the matters of joining the European Union, integrating the Union into society as a whole and becoming a successful EU Member State. Those questions are considered comprehensively in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*.

32. For its purposes, the Blueprint operates on the basis that the former United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is renamed the **United Kingdom of England and Wales and Northern Ireland** at the point of independence of Scotland.

33. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent references in the Blueprint to the 'United Kingdom' are to this continuing state.

34. In the absence of an appropriate and accepted name, the collection of the island of Ireland, the island of Great Britain and the other islands in their immediate vicinity are referenced in the Blueprint as the **Common Islands**.

35. The Blueprint does not assess the financial costs of measures outlined. Full analysis of Scotland's fiscal situation under independence should be undertaken separately.

36. The focus of the Blueprint rests on foreign policy institutions and structures. It does not propose policy positions, or outline defence, security or intelligence institutions.

1B. Principles and Values

37. Foreign policy is one of the defining aspects of a state. The manner in which a state presents itself externally and relates to others contributes significantly to its identity.

38. At the same time, external relations are not a matter of high diplomacy and pageantry for their own sake and without meaning. Scotland's foreign policy – and its success or failure – will have direct implications and real-world consequences for every single person in Scotland and for every facet of Scottish society.

39. Scotland has not conducted an independent foreign policy for over 313 years. In the building of a Scottish state, it will have a once-in-a-century opportunity to define its unique identity, purpose and role in Europe and the world.

40. The Republic must establish credible, robust and effective institutions, systems and policies to represent itself, fulfil its responsibilities and contribute to global progress.

41. Scotland will be a European small state. It will never be a great global power. Alone, it will rarely shape world events single-handedly. Accordingly, Scotland can achieve meaningful global impact only through multilateralism, cooperation and partnership.

42. Nevertheless, Scotland can manifestly achieve a successful and influential role in the world for its size and position, with the appropriate institutions, policies and strategy.

43. The Republic should always engage externally from a position founded on its values, based in its strategic national interests and shaped by its democratic process.

44. In constructing the new state, Scotland should jettison outmoded practice and adopt approaches which are innovative and effective.

45. As a Member State, Scotland will integrate the European Union into its constitutional order. The Union will become part of the Scottish state and change its character. It is far more than simply another international organisation which Scotland might join.

46. This reality must be fully appreciated and internalised by all Scottish foreign policy institutions and actors. A definitional distinction must be made between, on the one hand, **European Relations** and, on the other hand, **External Relations**.

47. Scotland's relationships with the EU institutions and the other Member States are not foreign affairs. The European level will be an intrinsic component of domestic affairs. Scotland must speak of 'fellow Europeans', not 'European friends'. Its foreign policy will be framed accordingly.

48. The Republic will define its interactions with the rest of Europe and the world through its **European and External Relations Policies** (EERP).

49. European relations consist of Scotland's efforts within the European Union, including engagement with fellow Member States and the Union institutions.

50. External relations consist of Scotland's efforts outwith the European Union, including engagement with non-EU states and multilateral organisations.

51. Scotland should adopt a European approach to every aspect of its external relations. The Government and Parliament will undertake full programmes of Europeanisation, as outlined in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*.[2]

52. Foreign policy must derive from the combination of values and interests. Without the former, it will be excessively transactional. Without the latter, it will be excessively idealistic. The two are interdependent and necessary for a successful foreign policy.

53. The Republic should resolve to conduct a **Values-Based Foreign Policy**, under which it will advance Scotland's values and interests, drive global change and contribute to ever greater peace, prosperity and freedom in the world.

54. In that direction, the Republic should define foundational principles for its European and external relations. Such principles will constitute the basis for the institutions, policies and practice which it will develop in the two domains.

55. **Scotland's Principles for External Relations** could be set as follows:

Republic of Scotland **Principles for External Relations**
1. Scotland will represent itself externally based on our values and interests together and conduct a values-based foreign policy
2. Scotland will strive for a world of peace, freedom, security and prosperity, in which every individual has the opportunity to achieve their potential
3. Scotland will support the advancement of multilateral organisations, in particular the United Nations, through constructive engagement
4. Scotland will uphold international law and an equitable, rules-based global system, leading by example in fulfilling our own legal obligations
5. Scotland will work cooperatively with other states of the world wherever possible, on the basis of common ground and shared values
6. Scotland will advocate an EU foreign policy which is coherent, effective, and united, promoting the values and positions of our Union in the world
7. Scotland will contribute to international development based on principles of partnership, co-creation, solidarity and friendship
8. Scotland recognises that our external credibility depends on our policies and actions at home, and that we must hold ourselves to high standards

56. These principles represent a grounded and constructive outlook which demonstrate Scotland's consistent and progressive approach to international relations.

57. Similarly, the Republic will define Principles for European Relations to structure its perspective on EU membership, as proposed in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*.[3]

58. **Scotland's Principles for European Relations** could be set as follows:

Republic of Scotland **Principles for European Relations**
1. Scotland believes in the shared values of our Union and the European ideal of building a more peaceful, prosperous and free Europe
2. Membership of our Union is in Scotland's strategic national interests and the means of achieving a better Scotland in a united Europe
3. European affairs are not foreign policy. The EU is part of the government of Scotland, shared with our fellow Member States
4. Scotland will be a positive Member State which participates in all our common institutions and contributes actively to the future of Europe
5. Scotland will work constructively in European partnership to address the internal and external challenges facing our Union
6. Scotland will promote democracy in our Union and the progressive involvement of citizens in decision-making at all levels
7. Scotland will seek ever closer relations with our fellow Member States, through the institutions of our Union and in direct cooperation
8. Scotland believes that our Union is a force for good in the world and that our collective global voice should become progressively united

59. Taken together, these Principles for European and External Relations are meaningful statements of Scotland's purpose and the direction of the state in the decades ahead.

60. The Principles give form to Scotland's common values, as they would in all probability be referenced in the Constitution of the Republic.

61. While it is not for the Blueprint to define them, these values will derive from Scottish society and the political mainstream. They would surely include the support for and the belief in democracy, the rule of law and human rights (incorporating civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights). Many others would equally emerge.

62. It is eminently feasible to pursue a values-based foreign policy in the modern world. In reality, this approach is Scotland's only viable avenue to global success.

63. Once a longer and wider horizon is taken, values and interests accord often.

64. It would serve Scotland's interests to ensure a stable European neighbourhood or to mitigate the worst effects of global climate change. These outcomes would also align with its values of peace, security, solidarity and partnership.

65. Observing the experiences of some states, prevalent thinking often contends that, at one point or another, a state must compromise its values to secure its interests.

66. By this logic, trade, investment, natural resources or even economic survival depend upon sacrificing beliefs for necessities. Many states become trapped in this paradigm to some degree. However, such a predicament is not inevitable.

67. Instead, the Republic can resolve to advance Scotland's interests ***and*** to uphold Scotland's values in its external relations, defending either or both where necessary.

68. Scotland can build a reputation as an outspoken advocate of its views and values in the world – even where it will place the Republic in opposition to great powers or an emerging direction of travel.

69. The sustainability of such a values-based approach to external relations will require the Republic to be forthright, consistent and transparent. It must adopt this approach early in the formative stages of independence and maintain it without exception.

70. Global developments in recent years have demonstrated that progress can never be taken for granted. Where Scotland believes in the United Nations, multilateralism and international law, so it must work steadfastly to sustain them.

71. At the same time, the Republic's external action must reflect its internal action. Its policies and practice at home impact its engagement abroad. It would be untenable for Scotland to promote values and principles without upholding them itself.

72. This connection does not oblige that Scotland must be perfect to promote its values. Instead, it demands that the Republic admit failures and address them appropriately, continue to strive for improvement and remain receptive to suggestions from others – including those whom the Republic might criticise on separate matters.

73. The Republic must give thoughtful consideration to the means by which the European Union and international organisations could be included in the Constitution. It must equally determine the processes by which international obligations will form part of its domestic legal system.

74. Scotland must formulate its institutions and policies in full recognition of the realities of European and global politics. It must be truly cognizant of international relations, diplomatic practice and geopolitical dynamics.

75. As a European small state, Scotland will have to both confront challenges and create opportunities. Most of the opportunities will be found through the European Union.

76. The Scottish state will be embedded in a highly-structured international system, with concomitant rights and responsibilities. Such a balance is inherent to multilateralism.

77. Political leaders have a profound responsibility to be honest with the Scottish public about the compromises which will be required at European and international levels.

78. It is probable that the question of the degrees of similarity or difference between the foreign policies of the Republic of Scotland and the United Kingdom will arise.

79. Scotland will be a notably different actor in the world compared to the former United Kingdom. However, its institutions and policies will be constructed with regard to its own circumstances, not those of another state.

80. The Republic must not entertain the concept of formulating external relations policy with an aim of being identifiably different from the United Kingdom for its own sake.

81. Instead, Scotland's European and External Relations Policies will be solely focused on achieving objectives in support of its values and interests. The Republic will find no interest in being defined by comparison to the United Kingdom.

82. Foreign policy is often reactive, made in response to developing events. That feature is unavoidable. Nevertheless, it is still possible to ground policy in a proactive vision.

83. As an independent state, Scotland must articulate its aspirations for Europe and the world, and the measures which it will pursue to make them a reality.

84. The Republic's success in the world will be determined in large part by the design of its institutions, the content of its strategy and the quality of its public debate.[4]

85. The systems underpinning Scotland's European and External Relations Policies must be sufficiently robust and effective. They must be adapted where required.

86. Scotland's diplomatic institutions and strategy are explored later in the Blueprint.

1C. Government Department

87. The Parliament of Scotland will establish by legislation a Government Department with principal responsibility for European and international relations.

88. This Department will implement the Government's European and external policies, conduct diplomacy and operate the state's global network of diplomatic missions.

89. The name of the Department will reflect Scotland's values, principles and outlook. It should accord with the Principles for European and External Relations.

90. The Parliament will create the **Department of European and External Relations**.

91. As proposed in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*, this name places European relations in the initial position; distinguishes between European relations and external relations; and relegates the outmoded 'foreign affairs' in favour of 'external relations'.

92. In its presentation, the Department will be styled in English, French and Gaelic, as follows: **Department of European and External Relations | Ministère des Relations européennes et extérieures | Roinn Chùisean Eòrpach agus Taoibh A-muigh**.

93. The prototype wordmark of the Department is as follows.

Department of European and External Relations
Ministère des Relations européennes et extérieures
Roinn Chùisean Eòrpach agus Taoibh A-muigh

94. It is envisaged that all Government Departments will make use of English and Gaelic, as State Languages. This Department will exceptionally make use of French, as a reflection of its global orientation – using two widely-spoken official languages of the United Nations. This approach will also demonstrate the Government's commitment to linguistic diversity within the European Union.

95. Multilingualism should be a founding principle of the Department and feature in every dimension of its operations. Languages and communication are pivotal to diplomacy.

96. In its design, mission and action, the Department of European and External Relations (DEER) will represent the Republic and its values in the rest of Europe and the world.

97. DEER should resolve to be a modern and vibrant ministry which advocates Scotland's values and interests, interlinks the Government with the institutions of the European Union and represents the Republic to other states and international organisations.

98. Inspired by the Republic's principles, the statement of purpose for the Department could be: ***Working for a better Scotland in a united Europe and a peaceful world*.**

99. This Department should have a close relationship with the Department of the Prime Minister, given their common interest in European and international affairs.

100. The Government should organise its operations on the basis of an **Integrated Model for European and External Relations**.

101. Under this approach, all relevant institutions should be situated in DEER – including the future Passport Authority of Scotland (rather than the Department of Justice) and the future Scottish Trade Council (rather than the Department of Economic Affairs).

102. At the same time, the Government should hold regular interdepartmental ministerial forums to discuss European and international developments, given their relevance to the work of all Government Departments.[5]

103. The Government should start the **European Relations Council** (EURELCO), a monthly format bringing together all ministers to consider EU matters and proposals.

104. The Government should similarly start the **External Relations Council** (RELEXCO), a monthly format bringing together all ministers to review global situations and trends.

105. In formulating policy, the Government and the Department should seek to benefit from expert analysis and advice, including latent expertise within Scottish society.

106. The Department should create the **Advisory Council on European Relations** (ACER), a space for dialogue between ministers, officials and experts on EU affairs.

107. The Department should also create the **Advisory Council on International Affairs** (ACIA), a space for dialogue between ministers, officials and experts on global issues.

108. To evidence its work, improve practice and promote transparency, the Department should publish an **Annual Report on Scotland's European and External Relations**.

109. The organisation of the Department is considered in detail later in the Blueprint.

1D. Civil Service

110. To assist the Government in exercising its functions, the Parliament of Scotland will establish by legislation the **Civil Service of Scotland** (Seirbheis Chatharra na h-Alba).

111. Within the Civil Service, a diplomatic corps will be needed. Inspired by the Republic's values, the state will create the **Scottish European and External Relations Service**.

112. The Service will be styled in English, French and Gaelic as: **Scottish European and External Relations Service | Service écossais pour les relations européennes et extérieures | Seirbheis na h-Alba airson Chùisean Eòrpach agus Taoibh a-muigh**.

113. The prototype wordmark of the Service is as follows.

Scottish European and External Relations Service

Service écossais pour les relations européennes et extérieures

Seirbheis na h-Alba airson Chùisean Eòrpach agus Taoibh A-muigh

114. The Scottish European and External Relations Service (SEERS) will form part of the Civil Service, but it will be operationally independent.

115. Such an approach is necessary, as the formulation and implementation of European and External Relations Policies require qualified personnel and specific procedures.

116. The effective functioning of DEER will depend upon SEERS members with requisite expertise, skills and experience pertinent to European and international relations. A model of portable generalists would not suffice.

117. Transfers from the wider Civil Service into SEERS should only be facilitated where all relevant qualifications are fully satisfied.

118. Reflecting the values of the Republic, the Government will, of its own intention or by mandate from the Parliament, enact policies and practice connected to diversity and representativeness in SEERS and the wider Civil Service.

119. The Government will set requirements for general service and particular positions in SEERS. Core competences will include expertise in the European Union, multilateral organisations, international relations and specific states; experience in European and international institutions; and linguistic, intercultural and diplomatic skills.

120. Senior positions in the Service will demand a progressively greater depth of skills, including those related to state representation, intermodal diplomacy, international negotiations, public communication and consular management.

121. The Parliament and the Government will determine citizenship rules for positions in SEERS and the wider Civil Service.

122. As an EU Member State, public service roles in Scotland will in general terms be open to citizens of Scotland, the European Union, EEA/EFTA states and Switzerland.

123. However, under EU law, those positions related to public authority or state interests may be reserved exclusively for citizens of Scotland.[6]

124. It is envisaged that certain posts in SEERS may be available to EU/EEA/CH citizens. The Republic may decide to restrict diplomatic or security roles.

125. It would be not warranted to make citizens of the United Kingdom or members of the Commonwealth of Nations eligible for the Civil Service of Scotland.

126. Relevant UK and Commonwealth citizens working for Scottish authorities at the point of independence could be offered expedited Scottish citizenship.

127. Further citizenship criteria may be developed, including in regard to plurinationality. Appropriate background, vetting and security clearance procedures will be required.

128. The Parliament and the Government must make the necessary investments in SEERS to ensure its ability to deliver the objectives with which its members will be tasked.

129. Providing adequate funding and resources for SEERS will be vital to its success.

130. The Government should encourage and fund secondments and exchanges between SEERS and other diplomatic services, EU institutions and multilateral organisations.

131. The Republic must assume a wider responsibility to make long-term investments in education, training and skills associated with European and external relations.

132. As outlined in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*, it should endow new degree programmes and courses in relevant subjects at the universities of Scotland.[7]

133. The Republic should establish the **European Academy of Scotland** (Acadamaidh Eòrpach na h-Alba), as a European, international and diplomatic affairs institute.

134. The Academy will provide training to members of SEERS from both academic and practitioner perspectives.

135. Such investments will ensure that Scotland produces qualified candidates for SEERS, the wider Civil Service, the EU Civil Service and the services of multilateral institutions of which Scotland is a member, including the United Nations.

1E. Interinstitutional Relations

136. The Government will be the state's primary representative in European and external relations. Yet, as the Constitution may provide, the other Principal Institutions of the State will have roles related to these domains. The electorate will also have views.

137. It is prudent and responsible for the Government to remain cognizant of institutional and public perspectives on European and international matters.

138. Where appropriate, the Government should listen attentively, engage proactively and work cooperatively. Constructive interinstitutional relations will often result in better outcomes. The Government will also give deference to the separation of powers.

139. For instance, decisions taken in the European Union institutions or the negotiation of treaties will principally engage the Government. At the same time, the Parliament will exercise its prerogatives, such as mandating Government positions in the EU Council or scrutinising a treaty to grant or deny ratification. Similarly, the electorate may be called upon to approve major EU treaty reform through referendums.

140. The precise circumstances will depend on the design of the Constitution and the new Scottish state. In any event, the Government cannot make such policy in isolation.

President of Scotland

141. The President will be the Head of State and, in consequence, an integral component of the Republic's European and international representation.

142. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Republic's diplomatic relations will be officially conducted in the name of the President.

143. The President will accredit Scottish ambassadors to other states; receive European and international ambassadors in Scotland; host State Visits by fellow Heads of State in Scotland; conduct State Visits to other states outwith Scotland; and sign treaties directly or have them signed by the Government on their behalf.

144. The President will serve as Commander-in-Chief of the Scottish Republic Defence Forces and could also exceptionally attend the European Council in the event of the incapacity of the Prime Minister.

145. The degree of political agency of the President will be regulated by the Constitution. Whatever approach is adopted, these tangible roles in European and external affairs demonstrate that the Republic would benefit from harmonious relations between the Government and the President, to the extent possible.

146. Irrespective of differences in their points of view, the two Institutions of the State will have to coordinate and cooperate on European and international relations.

147. The timing and counterparties of inward and outward State Visits should be made by common accord. Remarks by the President should not undermine the Government's foreign policy. The Government should not undervalue the roles of the President.

148. It would be sensible to develop mechanisms for consultation and dialogue between the two Institutions, while respecting the Constitution and separation of powers.

149. The President and the Prime Minister should have regular discussions of the business of the Government, including European and external relations.

150. The President could attend EURELCO and RELEXCO, either on a recurring basis or for noteworthy moments, such as the conclusion of an international agreement. When in attendance, the President should act as convener of the Council.[8]

151. The Department of the Prime Minister and the Department of European and External Relations should liaise with the Offices of the President on related logistical matters.

Parliament of Scotland

152. The relationship between the Government and the Parliament will be of a different nature, in that the Government will derive its mandate from the Parliament.

153. The Government will be directly accountable to the Parliament for its European and external conduct – on broad policies, specific decisions or particular instances.

154. While the Constitution may establish, to some degree, the functions of the Parliament in respect of European and international affairs, the Chamber will also define its role. It should resolve to be an active participant.

155. In the context of increasing numbers of policy decisions being taken at European and international levels, it is vital to democratic integrity and public confidence that the Parliament respond by intensifying its scrutiny of the Government on such matters.

156. It should establish robust mechanisms of oversight, accountability and control of the Government on European and external relations.

157. As set out in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*, the Parliament should create two committees to scrutinise different aspects of policy and decision-making.[9]

158. The **Grand Committee on European Union Affairs** (GCEUA) will cover matters of EU membership, including the Government's EU policy and positions in the EU Council.

159. The **European and External Relations Committee** (EERC) will cover matters of wider European and foreign policy, including bilateral and multilateral engagement.

160. The EERC will likely be the lead committee to review the operations and work of the Department of European and External Relations.

161. Depending upon its eventual role, the Parliament could have the capacity to mandate certain Government positions or votes in the EU Council. Such power could extend to multilateral organisations, including the United Nations – and especially the Security Council, where Scotland has been elected to serve as a non-permanent member.

162. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Parliament will have the power to approve or reject the ratification of treaties negotiated by the Government or by the European Union, where national ratification is required.

163. Should the Constitution create a hybrid parliamentary system, rather than the current parliamentary system of the United Kingdom, certain nominations and appointments by the Government could require the advice and consent of the Parliament.

164. Under such an approach, **Parliamentary Confirmation** would be necessary for agents representing the state externally at senior level, including postings as ambassador. Further consideration should be given to the principle of Parliamentary Confirmation.

165. The Government should work constructively with the Parliament, facilitating scrutiny of its European and External Relations Policies, listening to the Parliament's concerns and responding appropriately to parliamentary requests and instructions.

166. The other Principal Institution of the State, the Judiciary of Scotland, will not have a role in policy. The Government will receive and implement its judgements related to European and international law, whether connected to foreign policy or otherwise.

People of Scotland

167. In European and external relations, the Government will have to balance competing demands – upholding Scotland's values, ensuring Scotland's interests, cooperating within the European Union and multilateral organisations, managing interinstitutional relations and accounting for public opinion.

168. Certain aspects of European and international affairs will more prove salient with the public. The Government must make notable efforts to listen to people's perspectives.

169. Maintaining high public confidence in Scotland's participation in the European Union, the United Nations and other multilateral institutions must be essential to the state.

170. The Government should create predictability in major EU and international decisions.

171. As recommended in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*, it should publish a **National Protocol on EU Constitutional Decisions**, which will clarify what kinds of EU reform would require enhanced approval and the conditions for a referendum, for instance. This approach would foster public support by outlining democratic mechanisms in advance.[10]

172. The Government could establish an equivalent protocol for relevant decisions related to multilateral institutions.

173. In line with a **National Public Participation Strategy on the EU**, it should initiate the **Civic Forum on Europe**, a standing assembly for civic dialogue on European affairs.[11]

174. Similarly, it should initiate the **Civic Forum on Global Affairs** for international issues.

175. Ministers and senior officials in SEERS should regularly participate in the Forums. The Government should demonstrate how it has reflected conclusions from the bodies in the development and exercise of its European and External Relations Policies.

176. The Government should have regard to the programmes for citizens' discussion and consultation on EU and foreign policies instituted by other EU Member States.[12]

1F. Transition to Independence

177. The transition from the point of a referendum endorsing independence to the point of independence will be a period of momentous transformation for Scotland.

178. The structures, mechanics, timetable of constructing a Scottish state should be the subject of significant further analysis undertaken separately.

179. In European and international affairs, Scotland will prepare to represent itself wholly in its own right for the first time in centuries.

180. As proposed in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*, after a referendum endorsing independence, the Scottish Government and the UK Government should conclude a **Scotland-UK Framework Agreement** governing the process of separation and bilateral relations during the post-referendum, pre-independence period.[13]

181. The Framework Agreement should make the following provisions for the transition:[14]

- Scotland acquires international legal personality
- The UK Government endorses the Scottish Government's substantive engagement with the European Union in preparation of its eventual application for membership
- Scotland has standing to negotiate and conclude an EU-only Association Agreement with the European Union, taking effect at the point of independence
- The UK Government endorses the Scottish Government's engagement with international organisations, including the United Nations and NATO, with a view to future relations
- Scotland makes preparation for full bilateral relations with states of the world
- The UK Government supports the Scottish Government's conversion of paradiplomatic offices into quasi-diplomatic representations and the opening of new representations
- The Scottish Government and the UK Government make arrangements for the requisite funding of these activities, whether levied by Scotland or transferred from the UK state
- The Scottish Government and the UK Government agree information sharing procedures and take all necessary executive and legislative action to fulfil these objectives

182. It would be highly beneficial to Scotland for the two governments to work together in a pragmatic and cooperative manner, with the aim of delivering the independence of Scotland and the simultaneous mutual state recognition by both sides of each other at the point of independence.

183. At the **Point of Independence** (POI), Scotland will become a state and assume all the related rights and responsibilities, taking account of any provisional measures agreed with the United Kingdom. The date of POI should be defined in the resulting treaty.

184. The **Transition Phase** will span the point of referendum to the point of independence. While further analysis is required, this phase could reasonably last for 2-3 years.

185. During this period, Scotland will define the outlines of its European and international presence after independence, while focusing on building the future Scottish state.

186. Scotland will begin the process to establish the Department of European and External Relations and the Scottish European and External Relations Service. It will grow the diplomatic network and prepare for joining the EU and international organisations.

187. Its principal foreign policy message during the Transition Phase, particularly to the European Union and the United States, will be one of stability and reliability.

188. In every aspect of the transition, Scotland must consider the future evolution of the state, not simply focus on the functional needs to deliver independence.

189. The **Foundation Phase** will span the point of independence to the first 10 years after independence. In this phase, Scotland will develop its European and global roles.

190. The Republic will receive recognition from other of states of its sovereignty and it will recognise the sovereignty of other states. It will formally establish DEER and SEERS.

191. It will not be possible to have every element of Scotland's European and international representation fully operational at the point of independence as they should be in the long term. Degrees of staging and progressive development will be required.

192. The building of the Scottish network of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic missions in particular should be undertaken in stages, as considered later in the Blueprint.

193. Scotland will not have requisite standing to apply to join the EU or major multilateral organisations until the point of independence. It should however make preparations in those regards to the fullest extent possible during the Transition Phase.[15]

194. Full analysis of the modalities of EU accession is provided in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*. It will take Scotland potentially 44-78 months, probably 48-60 months to join the EU, from the point of application to the point of accession.[16]

195. The Government should therefore note that Scotland will have been independent for several years, established bilateral relations with states and joined most multilateral organisations by the time it completes the process to become an EU member.

196. In the pre-accession period, relations between Scotland and the EU should be based on the EU-only Association Agreement concluded during the Transition Phase, and potentially amended after the point of independence.

197. From the earliest stage, Scotland should have regard to its future obligations under the EU *acquis communautaire* and international law and design the state accordingly.

198. Scotland should seek to benefit from European and international expertise in building its foreign policy institutions, particularly from within the European Union.

199. The Government should create the **Scotland Consultation Group** (SCG), an informal forum for dialogue between leaders and officials from Scotland, Europe and beyond.

200. Given the tasks involved, an independent **Special Scrutiny Committee** (SSC) should be set up to monitor DEER and SEERS during the Transition and Foundation Phases.[17]

2. Department Organisation

201. The Department of European and External Relations will represent the Government and the state in the rest of Europe and the wider world. To fulfil its responsibilities, it will require the appropriate institutions, systems and structures. Every aspect of the Department should reflect its values and principles. Building the Department will be an evolutionary process, and openness to new ideas and innovation will be essential. Its success will rest on the individuals who will collectively make Scottish diplomacy.

202. This Chapter proposes the **Senior Leadership** of the Department of European and External Relations, its **Organisation Structure**, the ranks of **Diplomatic Personnel**, the **Department Headquarters**, **Department Operations** and **Department Culture**.

2A. Senior Leadership

203. Ensuring the success of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs in any circumstances requires good leadership. It is particularly crucial during the foundation of a new state.

204. The policies, practice and ethos established during the Foundation Phase will create precedents and patterns which will shape the Department of European and External Relations and its work in the decades to come.

205. Inspirational leadership and effective management will enable the Department and its personnel to conduct the Government's European and External Relations Policies and to represent Scotland in the rest of Europe and the wider world.

206. Leaders should have reference to the Principles for European and External Relations and the guiding principles and values of the Republic.

207. The senior leadership of the Department will be comprised of three distinct groups: **Government Ministers**, **Counsellors of State** and **Departmental Officials**.

Government Ministers

208. The Ministers responsible for the Department will provide political leadership, deliver high-level guidance and set policy goals, in line with the contents of the Programme for Government, the positions of the Cabinet and the views of the Prime Minister.

209. These Ministers will be primarily accountable to the Parliament for the Government's European and External Relations Policies and the wider Department.

210. The Department of European and External Relations should be led by a team of three ministers – one Cabinet Secretary and two junior Ministers. Such a structure will be consistent with the remit and functions of the Department.

211. The **Cabinet Secretary for European and External Relations** will have responsibility for the Department overall and for European and external affairs policies.

212. This role will be one of the most senior and prestigious in the Government, involving engagement with European and international counterparts, participation in European and global fora and travel to destinations around the world.

213. Alongside the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Secretary will be a chief representative of the Government and the Republic in the rest of Europe and the world.

214. The Cabinet Secretary will serve as the principal political leader of the Department, depending on it to deliver their agenda and equally valuing its role and work.

215. In providing direct political leadership for the Department, the Cabinet Secretary will be supported by two junior ministers.

216. The **Minister for European Affairs** will support EU institutional and decision-making matters, relations with fellow EU states and relations with non-EU European states.

217. Reflecting the significance of EU relations to the Government, this ministerial role will be based concurrently in the Department of European and External Relations and the Department of the Prime Minister. The Minister for European Affairs will work directly with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretary.

218. The **Minister for Global Cooperation** will support international development policy, engagement in multilateral organisations and relations with non-European states.

219. All the **Departmental Ministers** should seek to further common objectives, including deepening transatlantic relations and building links with the Scottish global diaspora.

220. While Heads of Government might regularly rearrange ministerial portfolios, the titles and briefs for DEER should change as infrequently as possible. It is important to have consistency for the benefit of European and international actors relating to Scotland.

221. Foreign policy is not the exclusive preserve of the Departmental Ministers. The Prime Minister will be actively involved in setting policy and conducting diplomacy, holding dialogues, attending summits and building coalitions.

222. Different Cabinet Members will be involved in external relations, such as the Cabinet Secretary for Defence. Every Cabinet Member will have a role in European relations, related to the structures and policies of the European Union.

223. The DEER Departmental Ministers will therefore have a paramount coordinating role. Interministerial forums, such as EURELCO and RELEXCO, will aid in building cohesion between Cabinet Members on European and external relations. Effective governing will require good relations between the Prime Minister and DEER Cabinet Secretary.

224. Full analysis of the composition and organisation of other Government Departments of an independent Scottish state should be undertaken separately.

Counsellors of State

225. In constructing the Scottish state from a newfound position, the Government has the opportunity to be innovative in the design of its foreign policy institutions.

226. It should establish a system of high-level thematic EU and foreign policy counsellors to advise the Government, represent the state and drive sectoral priorities.

227. The **Counsellors of State for European and External Relations** will be senior figures in the operation of the Government's European and External Relations Policies.

228. They will perform a tripartite role – as principal advisers to the Prime Minster, the Departmental Ministers and the Government; diplomatic representatives in relevant bilateral, European and multilateral settings; and authoritative coordinators of their remit areas across the work of the Government.

229. This counsellor system combines the functions of different senior government actors in the executive structures of some European states and the United States.

230. The Counsellors of State will be jointly based in the Department of the Prime Minister and the Department of European and External Relations.

231. They will be styled as Ambassadors and accredited as relevant and appropriate.

232. The Counsellors of State could be organised as follows.

Department of the Prime Minister
Department of European and External Relations
Counsellors of State

SIGN	COUNSELLOR
CfC	Chief Counsellor of State for European and External Relations
DCfC	Depute Chief Counsellor of State Counsellor of State for National Security
CC	Counsellor of State for Climate Change and Response
PR	Counsellor of State for the High North and Polar Regions
GD	Counsellor of State for the Global Diaspora
HR	Counsellor of State for Democracy and Human Rights
ML	Counsellor of State for Multilateralism
IT	Counsellor of State for Innovation and Technology
CI	Counsellor of State for Common Islands Relations

233. The **Chief Counsellor of State for European and External Relations** (CfC) will have primary responsibility for strategy and representation on EU and international affairs.

234. The **Depute Chief Counsellor of State and Counsellor of State for National Security** (DCfC) will cover national security and deputise for the Chief Counsellor as required.

235. The **Counsellor of State for Climate Change and Response** (COS-CC) will cover the all-society climate change response and work at European and international levels.

236. The **Counsellor of State for the High North and Polar Regions** (COS-PR) will cover all dimensions of Scotland's position and role in the High North, Arctic and Antarctic.

237. The **Counsellor of State for the Global Diaspora** (COS-GD) will cover the development of relations with Scotland's global diaspora and its integration into Scottish society.

238. The **Counsellor of State for Democracy and Human Rights** (COS-HR) will cover the promotion of democracy and the protection and advancement of human rights.

239. The **Counsellor of State for Multilateralism** (COS-ML) will cover the progression and defence of multilateralism, the United Nations and an equitable, rules-based system.

240. The **Counsellor of State for Innovation and Technology** (COS-IT) will cover evolution and regulation of new fields, including artificial intelligence and quantum technology.

241. The **Counsellor of State for Common Islands Relations** (COS-CI) will cover bilateral relations with the UK, trilateral relations with Ireland and the UK, and wider CI issues.

242. The Chief Counsellor and Depute Chief Counsellor will engage most regularly with the Prime Minister, the DEER Cabinet Secretary and other Cabinet Members.

243. They will take particular responsibility for European and transatlantic relations.

244. In common reference, the Counsellors of State will employ shorter titles, such as the National Security Counsellor. Outwith the state, they may be titled with reference to Scotland, such as the Scottish Counsellor of State for Climate Change and Response.

245. The National Security Counsellor will be the equivalent of a National Security Advisor.

246. The counsellor system will supplant a possible collection of Ambassadors-at-Large, personal representatives and special envoys with a single and integrated structure.

247. Given Scotland's status as a European small state, this system is superior. It ensures that the Counsellors of State are rooted in the senior level, rather than free-floating.

248. Through their representation of the Prime Minister, the Counsellors of State will have significant European and international standing, which will enhance their profile and ability to drive strategic global priorities for Scotland.

249. In particular, the Counsellors of State will serve as high-level contacts on their remits for senior figures in other states, the European Union and multilateral organisations.

250. The remits of the Counsellor of State should reflect the core thematic priorities of the Republic's European and external relations. They should not change frequently.

251. The Counsellors will work collaboratively with the senior officials of the Department of the Prime Minister and the Department of European and External Relations.

252. The appointment of the Chief Counsellor, Depute Chief Counsellor and Counsellors of State should be subject to Parliamentary Confirmation.

Departmental Officials

253. The Senior Departmental Officials will provide administrative leadership, drive the implementation of the Government's European and External Relations Policies and ensure effective management of the Department.

254. It is envisaged that Government Departments will adopt a leadership structure based on a Secretary-General of the Department and Directors of Directorates.

255. The **Secretary-General of the Department** will have primary responsibility at official level for the administration and management of the Department.

256. The **Depute Secretary-General of the Department** will assist the Secretary-General in the administration and management of the Department.

257. The Secretary-General and the Depute Secretary-General will be the most senior members of the Scottish European and External Relations Service.

258. In that regard, they should have experience and knowledge of SEERS, or equivalent experience, and not be portable administrators.

259. The two officials will direct Department operations, in continuous consultation with the Departmental Ministers and the Counsellors of State as relevant.

260. The appointment of the Secretary-General and Depute Secretary-General should be subject to Parliamentary Confirmation.

2B. Organisation Structure

261. The Department should adopt an organisation structure that is effective, efficient and suited to the particular requirements of European and international relations.

262. The design of the Department should be oriented around the delivery of its European and External Relations Policies, with sufficient regard to its evolution and growth.

263. The **Principal Organisation Structure of the Department** could be set as follows.



264. Under this structure, the Departmental Ministers will provide political leadership and direction. The Counsellors of State will provide advice, strategy and representation. The Departmental Officials will provide administrative leadership and management.

265. The Minister for European Affairs, the Counsellors of State and the future Director for EU Integration will be jointly based in the Department of the Prime Minister and the Department of European and External Relations.

266. This approach will connect the Departments in a manner which is likely to be unique in the Government. It is eminently sensible, given the integral role of EU and external relations in the functions of both the Prime Minster and the DEER Cabinet Secretary.

267. In that regard, these jointly-based positions will promote a common perspective on EU and international affairs, which will highly benefit a small state like Scotland.

268. To facilitate its work, the Department will be arranged into Departmental Divisions. They should be in three categories – Offices, Directorates and Agencies.

269. To begin, the Department should have two **Executive Offices**, twelve **Departmental Directorates**, one **Special Directorate** and three **Departmental Agencies**.

270. The Department of European and External Relations could be structured as follows.

Department of European and External Relations **Departmental Divisions**		
SIGN	**DIVISION**	**HEAD**
SG1	Office of the Secretary-General	Secretary-General
SG2	Office of the Depute Secretary-General	Depute Secretary-General
1	Directorate for Europe	Director for Europe
2	Directorate for Political Affairs	Political Director
3	Directorate for Multilateral Institutions	Director for Multilateral Institutions
4	Directorate for Global Cooperation	Director for Global Cooperation
5	Directorate for Americas	Director for Americas
6	Directorate for Africa and Middle East	Director for Africa and Middle East
7	Directorate for Asia and Pacific	Director for Asia and Pacific
8	Directorate for Consular Services	Director for Consular Services
9	Directorate for Trade	Director for Trade
10	Directorate for Protocol	Chief of Protocol
11	Directorate for Legal Affairs	Director for Legal Affairs
12	Directorate for Operations	Director for Operations
S1	Directorate for EU Integration	Director for EU Integration
A1	Scottish Global Cooperation Agency	Director for Global Cooperation
A2	Scottish Trade Council	Director for Trade
A3	Passport Authority of Scotland	Director for Consular Services

271. The **Office of the Secretary-General** (SG1) **[DEER-SG1]** will support the Secretary-General in the administration and management of the Department.

272. The **Office of the Depute Secretary-General** (SG2) **[DEER-SG2]** will support the Depute Secretary-General in the administration and management of the Department.

273. The **Directorate for Europe** (EUR) **[DEER-1]** will cover EU affairs, relations with fellow EU states and relations with non-EU European states, including Russia and the UK.

274. The **Directorate for Political Affairs** (POL) **[DEER-2]** will cover political matters, CFSP, defence, security, NATO, human rights, migration, polar regions and climate change.

275. The **Directorate for Multilateral Institutions** (MUL) **[DEER-3]** will cover coordination of engagement at the UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, OECD and other institutions.

276. The **Directorate for Global Cooperation** (GCO) **[DEER-4]** will cover international development, civil society relations, diaspora relations and intermodal diplomacy.

277. The **Directorate for Americas** (AME) **[DEER-5]** will cover relations with North, Central and South America and the Caribbean, including the United States and Canada.

278. The **Directorate for Africa and Middle East** (AFM) **[DEER-6]** will cover relations with Africa and the Middle East, including the African Union and other regional institutions.

279. The **Directorate for Asia and Pacific** (ASP) **[DEER-7]** will cover relations with Asia, the Pacific and Oceania, including China, Japan, India, Pakistan and regional institutions.

280. The **Directorate for Consular Services** (CON) **[DEER-8]** will cover state documents, registrations, visas and authorisations, consular assistance and repatriation.

281. The **Directorate for Trade** (TRA) **[DEER-9]** will cover trade strategy, trade promotion, exports, investment, innovation, trade policy and analysis.

282. The **Directorate for Protocol** (PRO) **[DEER-10]** will cover the regulation of diplomatic missions in Scotland, dignitary visits, Presidential relations and general procedure.

283. The **Directorate for Legal Affairs** (LEG) **[DEER-11]** will cover state legal representation outwith Scotland, legal advice, extradition, legal assistance and treaty management.

284. The **Directorate for Operations** (OPS) **[DEER-12]** will cover human resources, finance, estates, communications, security, policy planning, evaluation and internal audit.

285. The Government will create a joint Special Directorate in the Department of the Prime Minister and the Department of European and External Relations for EU accession.

286. The **Directorate for EU Integration** (EUI) **[DEER-S1]** will be the central coordinating command for all Government work related to Scotland's process to join the EU.

287. The Parliament of Scotland will establish by legislation three Departmental Agencies attached to the Department of European and External Relations.

288. The **Scottish Global Cooperation Agency** (GCA) **[DEER-A1]** will carry out international development policy, international assistance policy and wider partnerships.

289. The **Scottish Trade Council** (STC) **[DEER-A2]** will carry out trade representation and promotion, including exports and investment, and sustainable, ethical trade policy.

290. The **Passport Authority of Scotland** (PAS) **[DEER-A3]** will carry out the issuance of state documents of identification, including passports, and related matters.

291. The Directorates will be further divided into Divisions and Units as appropriate.

292. The Directorates will be led by **Departmental Directors**, who will be senior members of SEERS and report to the Depute Secretary-General and the Secretary-General as relevant. Together, the senior leadership and the Directors will manage DEER's work.

293. Given the nature of international relations, it is natural that the remits of the Directors will overlap in multiple instances. The success of the Department will depend upon their good cooperation and effective coordination.

294. The Political Director and the Chief of Protocol will have differentiated titles, to align with common practice. They will have equivalent standing to the other Directors.

295. The Director for Global Cooperation will have responsibility for the Scottish Global Cooperation Agency; the Director for Trade for the Scottish Trade Council; and the Director for Consular Services for the Passport Authority of Scotland.

296. It is conceivable that the appointment of Departmental Directors should be subject to Parliamentary Confirmation.

297. The Directorate for Europe, the First Directorate of the Department, will likely require the largest number of professional SEERS members of any Directorate, considering its responsibilities for EU institutional affairs and relations with all European states.

298. The Directorate for Consular Services will likely require the largest number of staff overall, given its operation of the Passport Authority of Scotland and related demand.

299. The Department will have four **Area Directorates** covering relations with different parts of the world: Europe; Americas; Africa and Middle East; and Asia and Pacific.

300. The Republic's bilateral diplomatic missions will report in the first instance to their respective Area Directorate.

301. The Area Directorates will have general responsibility for managing relations with all the territories in their area, whether or not Scotland has a diplomatic mission there.

302. The Directorate for Operations would be a super-directorate for administration, with functions that may often be separated into different divisions. Consideration should be given to this streamlined approach and weighed against alternative options.

303. The Directorate for EU Integration is designed to operate until Scotland becomes a Member State of the European Union. Its expertise should be retained in some form.

304. The functions of the three Departmental Agencies are outlined later in the Blueprint.

305. The Organisation Structure of the Department should be reviewed periodically.

2C. Department Personnel

306. Beyond its leadership, the Department will be operated by members of the Scottish European and External Relations Service and the wider Civil Service. The Department would not exist without them, and it is incumbent on leaders to value their service.

307. Members of SEERS will serve in diplomatic and administrative roles. Members of the Civil Service will serve in technical, supporting and certain administrative roles.

308. In accordance with the procedures and criteria which will be established, members of SEERS who satisfy relevant conditions will be granted a **Diplomatic Commission**.

309. Commissions will be made under the **Diplomatic Ranks** of the Scottish European and External Relations Service. These ranks should have reference to common diplomatic tradition of international relations.

310. The Diplomatic Ranks of SEERS could be constituted as follows.

Scottish European and External Relations Service
Diplomatic Ranks

LEVEL	RANK
SEERS-10	Secretary-General
SEERS-9	Depute Secretary-General
SEERS-8	Assistant Secretary-General
SEERS-7	Minister Plenipotentiary
SEERS-6	Counsellor
SEERS-5	First Secretary
SEERS-4	Second Secretary
SEERS-3	Third Secretary

311. It is reasonable to expect that commissions of direct entry into SEERS will generally be made only up to the rank of First Secretary (SEERS-5).

312. An essential distinction must be made between, on the one hand, Diplomatic Ranks and, on the other hand, Diplomatic Assignments.

313. **Diplomatic Assignments** will consist of roles within the Department in Scotland and postings at diplomatic missions in the rest of Europe and the world.

314. Assignments will be made with regard to rank, but variation will exist across postings.

315. For instance, a **Head of Mission** posting could be filled by a Counsellor through to an Assistant Secretary-General depending on the mission size, location and importance.

316. Some assignments will involve an **Assignment Title**. Within the Department, roles as Departmental Director would include the title of *Director*. Postings as Head of Mission could include the title of *Ambassador*, *Permanent Representative* or *Consul General*.

317. In this system, the style as Ambassador in particular is transitory and linked to a role.

318. The positions of Secretary-General and Depute Secretary-General should be the only roles for which rank and title are synonymous.

319. It is anticipated that a single position as Depute Secretary-General will be created. It would however be possible to commission more than one person at this rank, should it be organisationally and operationally prudent to do so.

320. It is envisaged that the following ranks will be associated with certain assignments:

- An Assistant Secretary-General will normally serve as Departmental Director or Head of Mission at the largest and most significant Embassies and Permanent Representations
- A Minister Plenipotentiary may often serve as Departmental Director or Head of Mission at Embassies not otherwise indicated under the rank of Assistant Secretary-General
- A Counsellor may often serve as Head of Mission at Consulates General

321. Other assignments will include: in the Department, Head of Division and Head of Unit; in missions, Depute Head of Mission, Head of Section and Officer.

322. Instead of desk officers, the Department could use a system of **Country Coordinators** and **Regional Coordinators**.

323. Regular Diplomatic Commissions should not involve the Parliament. However, it is conceivable that assignments with title of Ambassador or Permanent Representative should be subject to Parliamentary Confirmation.

324. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, individuals appointed to an assignment as Ambassador will be accredited by the President of the Republic. They will normally be styled as *Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary*.

325. The Government may resolve to create the special rank of **Ambassador of Scotland**.

326. This rank would be bestowed upon those individuals who have made exceptional and meritorious contributions to Scottish and European diplomacy. It should incorporate permanent style as Ambassador. The Parliament or the President may have a role in the candidature process or its award.

327. In the Transition Phase, the Scottish Government will conduct a prominent campaign to build the diplomatic corps. This **General Recruitment** will be intrinsically linked to the creation of the Scottish European and External Relations Service.

328. Given the circumstances of building the new state, an alternative will be required to senior Diplomatic Commissions that would normally be awarded by internal process.

329. In response, the Government should issue **Foundational Diplomatic Commissions**. Such commissions will be made for the purposes of establishing SEERS and ensuring that it will have the requisite members in the formative period after independence.

330. In particular, this procedure will enable the Government to commission immediately Assistant Secretaries-General, Ministers Plenipotentiary and Counsellors.

331. Foundational Diplomatic Commissions should require Parliamentary Confirmation. They should be subject to review by the Special Scrutiny Committee, or other bodies which the Parliament may designate.

332. The range of necessary policies and procedures related to service in SEERS should be formulated during the Transition Phase.

333. It is common for many diplomatic postings to last for three years. Reflection should be given to whether such an approach is suitable for SEERS in the Foundation Phase.

334. The long-term viability and success of SEERS will depend on applications by suitably qualified candidates. This imperative demonstrates the importance of investment in the relevant education, training and skills programmes by the state for the public.

335. Analysis of the structure of the wider Civil Service of Scotland under independence should be undertaken separately.

2D. Department Headquarters

336. The Department will require suitable premises for its headquarters, reflective of its responsibilities and its standing as one of the principal ministries of government.

337. Consideration should be given from the earliest stage in the Transition Phase to the potential options for the Department's headquarters.

338. Buildings and institutions have significance, particularly in the contexts of diplomacy and international relations. The Department should reflect the values of the Republic.

339. The DEER headquarters should be established on the following core principles:

- Location: It should be centrally situated, in proximity to relevant national institutions
- Representation: It should reflect the diversity and vibrancy of Scottish society
- Accessibility: It should be welcoming to staff, guests and the public
- Security: It should be secure to conduct diplomacy and protect national security
- Transparency: It should be open and visible, in the manner and to the extent possible

340. The Department's premises should promote a collaborative and healthful working environment which is positive, dynamic and flexible.

341. In keeping with the Principles for European Relations and the values of the Republic, the symbols of European integration should feature with the symbols of Scotland.

342. The European flag will be placed alongside the Saltire at the exterior and interior of the building, as should be the case in every department and office of the Government.

343. Examples of Scottish and European history, art and culture should be situated in the building, including gifts that may be made to Scotland in recognition of its statehood.

344. The building or its street could be named after the first state to recognise Scotland as an independent state or after a country of friendship for Scotland.

345. While the concept of situating certain Government institutions outwith Edinburgh has merits, this Department must be located in the capital.

346. Its functioning will depend on regular direct interaction with the Department of the Prime Minister, the Parliament, diplomatic missions of other states, offices of the European Union and potential international organisations in Edinburgh.

347. The headquarters should host an **Operations Centre**, which will aggregate relevant information, monitor global events and coordinate responses to situations and crises.

348. The premises should incorporate quality facilities for meeting interpretation and the hosting of high-level dialogues, summits and other events.

349. The purchase, refurbishment or construction of the DEER headquarters should be subject to rigorous oversight from the Special Scrutiny Committee, or other bodies which the Parliament may designate.

2E. Department Operations

350. The Department must develop appropriate mechanisms to organise its operations and fulfil its obligations to the Government and the people.

351. In that regard, it must adopt satisfactory corporate governance arrangements.

352. The Department's operations will be guided by the **Departmental Council**, a senior management committee comprising the Secretary-General, the Depute Secretary-General, Departmental Directors and other relevant officials.

353. The Council should support the effective, sustainable and streamlined functioning of the organisation, incorporating a wide range of views and perspectives.

354. The work of the Department should be structured around sound strategy, including a multiannual departmental strategy, annual action plans, specific operational plans for individual divisions and custom business plans for diplomatic missions.

355. Standards for SEERS members and other Civil Service members in the Department should be developed, including a **Diplomatic Code of Conduct** (DCC).

356. A **Vademecum on Scottish, European and International Diplomatic Relations and Practice** should be published and made available to all personnel in the Department.

357. The functioning of the Department should be monitored by multiple levels of scrutiny and assessment, with the purpose of identifying successes and weaknesses, making continual improvements, and sharing and learning best practice.

358. Within the Government, the Department will be reviewed through its Internal Audit Division and through wider Government systems of evaluation, audit and control.

359. Outwith the Government, the Department will be scrutinised by the Parliament, the Special Scrutiny Committee and other independent audit and evaluation authorities.

360. The Department's scrutinisers will demand high standards, to which the organisation should also hold itself, in its work, conduct and performance.

361. The Parliament and the Government must in turn ensure that DEER has the funding and resources needed to fulfil the responsibilities with which it has been entrusted.

362. In the design of the Department's institutions, systems and practice, close attention should be paid to the approaches of European counterparts.

363. The potential of the Scotland Consultation Group should be maximised, with insight and suggestions from fellow European leaders, officials and thinkers contributing to the formulation of the best path for Scotland, in view of its situation.

364. Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Norway are pertinent European states of reference for Scotland given the relative similarities, including population.

365. Many points of comparison can be made from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) of these states and their diplomatic networks in particular.

366. A selection of relevant European MFA comparators for Scotland is as follows.[18]

European States
Ministries of Foreign Affairs Comparators

STATE	POPULATION 2019 (MIL)	GDP 2019 (BIL)	DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS	EMBASSIES	EST STAFF ABROAD	MFA BUDGET 2019 (MIL)
Denmark	5.81	€312.75	92	68	500	€2,227.25
Finland	5.52	€240.56	90	74	550	€1,121.71
Scotland	**5.46**	**€208.02**	—	—	—	—
Norway	5.33	€362.24	99	80	600	€4,251.15
Ireland	4.90	€356.05	91	66	350	€802.40

Source | Eurostat · National Records of Scotland · Scottish Government · European MFAs and National Budgets

367. These figures are useful as general reference, not prescriptive guides or standards.

368. Every country will have its unique circumstances. Moreover, Scotland will be building a new state, whereas these states have been independent for decades and centuries.

369. At the same time, these comparators give information for reflection on the direction which a European small state like Scotland could take for its own institutions.

370. These states operate around 70 embassies and 90 diplomatic missions in total (and higher for Norway, with around 80 and 100 respectively). This data does not include Danish Innovation Centres and Trade Offices.

371. Ireland is currently in the process of expanding its diplomatic network, as part of its *Global Ireland: Ireland's Global Footprint to 2025* strategy.[19]

372. The number of diplomats and seconded staff stationed in diplomatic missions varies across the four states, from an estimated 350 for Ireland to 600 for Norway.

373. Accounting for all personnel, including locally-recruited staff, the Foreign Service of a European state of this situation could range from around 1,500 to 2,000 people.

374. The budgets for the MFAs of these four states are contrasting. They reflect the total expenditure allocated under that ministry in the national budget.

375. Accordingly, the figures go beyond the operational costs of the ministry, and include international development spending, contributions to international organisations and whatever other spending responsibilities are given to that MFA by its government.

376. The budgets of Denmark and particularly Norway are larger in significant part due to their higher spending on international development and international assistance.

377. These annual MFA budgets reflect the requirements and commitments of states that are independent and operational. Naturally, they are not relatable to the foundational costs which would be involved in the establishment of the Scottish state.

378. Scotland should remain continually receptive to the MFA and diplomatic practice of its European counterparts, especially in the Transition and Foundation Phases.

379. The building of the Department will be an evolutive process, which will benefit from an openness to innovation, learning and improvement.

2F. Department Culture

380. The Department of European and External Relations will be an entirely new entity for Scotland, as a country which has never had a modern Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

381. The current Scottish Government's Directorate for External Affairs can form a core of the new Department. It has expertise and knowledge which will be valuable.[20]

382. At the same time, the new Department will have powers, responsibilities, structures and funding at a greater magnitude. Inherently, new approaches will be required.

383. No presumption should be made that the existing systems and practice of the current Scottish Government will be automatically ported to the Government of Scotland.

384. The creation of DEER will present a unique opportunity to determine the best path to represent Scotland in the rest of Europe and the world as an independent state.

385. The Department should be founded, from its first moment, on an ethos reflecting the values of the Republic and the Principles for European and External Relations.

386. By nature of the transition to independence, the foundational members of SEERS will hail from a wide range of backgrounds and experiences, without having first worked in the Service at any rank or in any assignment.

387. Different individuals will have worked variously for the Scottish Government, the UK Government (including the Diplomatic Service), the European Union, the services of other governments, international organisations and other entities.

388. Some individuals will have more experience in European and international relations. Others will have more experience in the functioning of the civil service in Scotland. It is perfectly possible that the overlap between the two will be minimal.

389. The fundamental task will be to create common purpose among a disparate founding group of individuals and to build a coherent Scottish diplomatic service, while also constructing the Department, quite possibly under pressures of time and resource.

390. This process will not be one of assimilation. DEER and SEERS will benefit enormously from the experiences and expertise of the foundational members. It will instead be one of community building, under common rules, standards and practice.

391. The Foundational Diplomatic Commissions must cover the full spectrum of diversity, talent and expertise with Scottish society and the Scottish diaspora.

392. The Republic should avoid a system of regular political appointments of external individuals to senior diplomatic ranks and assignments, as exists in some states.

393. The Department should provide rich professional development opportunities for its members, including training, exchanges and secondments. It should foster such links in particular with fellow EU Member States, including at senior levels.

394. Serving as a foundational member in the Department will present its challenges, but equally be a rare opportunity to make defining contributions to Scottish diplomacy.

3. European Union

395. As a Member State, Scotland will contribute to setting the Union's policies, including its foreign policy. While the Common Foreign and Security Policy remains a notably intergovernmental sphere, interest is now building in taking steps to make the EU a more global actor. Both in these institutional debates and foreign affairs matters that arise, Scotland will be an active participant, working in the Council and engaging with the other institutions. Where it is strategic, it can influence the direction of the Union.

396. This Chapter outlines the basis of **EU Foreign Policy**, **Scotland in EU Foreign Policy**, Scotland's role in the **European Council and EU Council**, relationships with **Other EU Institutions**, its **Alliances and Partnerships** and ongoing **EU Foreign Policy Debates**.

3A. EU Foreign Policy

397. The European Union derives its competences from the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. While the Member States have transferred certain powers to the Union, they retain others for themselves.[21]

398. In that regard, the Union operates a composite foreign policy, which is comprised of supranational elements exercised by the Union institutions and intergovernmental elements decided by the Member States. At the same time, the Member States also maintain their individual foreign policies.

399. The **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP) is the Union's primary instrument of traditional foreign policy. It is arguably the most intergovernmental domain of EU decision-making, with significant agency retained by the Member States.[22]

400. Exceptionally, under the CFSP, the Member States share the right of initiative with the European Commission. Most decisions require unanimity in the Council.

401. The **Common Security and Defence Policy** (CSDP) is a specific dimension of the CFSP concerned with the Union's defence policy and cooperation.[23]

402. In addition, the EU operates the **European Neighbourhood Policy** (ENP), a dedicated framework for relations with certain states in geographical proximity to the Union.[24]

403. While the Member States, through the Council, exercise substantial control over the EU's conventional foreign policy mechanisms, contemporary international relations concern many aspects which fall under more supranational procedures.

404. In particular, the **Common Commercial Policy** (CCP), under which trade agreements are negotiated, is an exclusive competence of the Union. Wider policies on economic regulation and matters such as data protection often have extraterritorial reach.

405. With respect to foreign, security and defence policies, various sensitivities among the Member States must be managed. Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden still designate themselves as 'neutral' states. Currently, 21 of 27 are members of NATO.[25]

406. Resulting from a combination of the Member States pursuing distinct national foreign policies, the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP and differing positions on global issues, decision-making on EU foreign policy can be laborious and divisive, even in situations where broad consensus exists on general principles.[26]

407. Through the specific EU foreign policy instruments and wider Union policies, smaller Member States can amplify their global voice where they are successful in influencing EU positions, decisions and actions.

408. The political dynamics within the European Union, including the status of the Franco-German relationship and the different priorities of the Member States, will impact on the direction of EU policies and initiatives.

409. The development of the Union's foreign policy is likely to command increasing focus and interest in the years ahead.

3B. Scotland in EU Foreign Policy

410. As a Member State, Scotland will be a principal stakeholder in the EU. It will have the right and responsibility to articulate positions on all matters, including foreign policy.

411. In the formative period of membership after accession, Scotland will begin to define its role and profile within the Union. It will build relationships and cultivate influence.

412. It must be intently appreciated that Scotland will fit into a much larger EU picture and enter a world of ideological differences, intense debates and competing narratives.

413. At the heart of major EU decision-making, the niceties of shared European sentiment are much less consequential, replaced by strategy, calculations and bargaining.

414. In this environment, Scotland must recognise its challenges, work adroitly and create opportunities, in full recognition of the realities of its situation within the EU.

415. The Republic should invest substantially in its post-accession transition to influence and success as an EU Member State, as articulated in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*.[27]

416. While joining the European Union will have a transformational impact on the Scottish state, Scotland will, in a much smaller way, also change the character of the Union. It will form part of the EU's institutions, policies and identity.

417. This impact on the EU will extend to its foreign policy, where Scotland will introduce its views and perspective on the external decisions and orientations of the Union.

418. The formative years of membership will be a period of adjustment and early growth for the Republic, as it acclimatises to EU policy-making and forges connections.

419. While it is less likely to launch its own ambitions EU plans during this period, Scotland will still advocate its values and interests from the point of its accession to the Union.

420. A foundational necessity for Scotland will be to demonstrate unequivocally that it is wholly committed to the Union, and that it will not be a vehicle, directly or indirectly, for the positions and interests of the United Kingdom. Scotland must speak for itself.

421. As a Member State, the Republic will need to formulate positions on all matters of EU foreign policy, and other policies, which may arise. As detailed earlier in the Blueprint and in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*, the Government and the Parliament must build the necessary structures to take relevant decisions and advocate national positions.

422. The Republic's positions on EU foreign policy matters should align with the Principles for European and External Relations.

423. The Government should facilitate interdepartmental discussion of relevant questions through EURELCO and maximise the potential of ACER and ACIA for expert advice.

424. Scotland should have interest in an EU foreign policy that is ambitious, innovative and reflective of the values of the Union. It should work in that direction.

425. Thoughtful consideration should be given to the distinctive contribution that Scotland will make to the substance and advancement of the Union's foreign policy.

426. This contribution could derive from Scotland's close bilateral relations with particular third countries which would be valuable to the Union, or from Scotland's expertise on issues of global concern which it could uniquely offer to the Union.

427. The Government must also have regard to influence and networks beyond the formal institutions of the Union and the specific interlocutors within them. It should cultivate relationships with various actors across policy-making spheres and wider society.[28]

428. It could sponsor a major annual summit, such as an **Edinburgh Transatlantic Forum**.

3C. European Council and EU Council

429. Scotland's direct institutional participation in the formulation of EU foreign policy, as a Member State, will be structured through the European Council and the EU Council.

430. Through these interlinked EU institutions, the Government will interact with the other Member States, contribute to Council positions and jointly decide relevant matters.

431. The Government will also engage with Member States bilaterally and multilaterally.

432. In response to geopolitical developments and in furtherance of the Union's proactive objectives, the Council will consider a range of foreign policy measures, including the application, extension or removal of sanctions, defence-oriented operations, peace-keeping missions and coordinated engagement in multilateral organisations.

433. Matters related to the CFSP will be considered in accordance with its dedicated rules and procedures. Other matters, such as the conclusion of international agreements, will proceed under separate relevant processes.

434. The **European Council** defines the agenda of the Union, issues political guidance and takes decisions on difficult high-level matters, including on foreign policy.[29]

435. The Prime Minister will attend the European Council. Heads of State and Government are the exclusive permitted participants, so the Prime Minister could not be replaced by another minister. As Head of State, the President could exceptionally attend.

436. The **EU Council** usually considers and takes decisions on foreign policy in its **Foreign Affairs Council** (FAC) configuration. Depending on the subjects under review, a FAC meeting may have a particular focus on Defence, Development or Trade.[30]

437. The Cabinet Secretary for European and External Relations will normally attend the Foreign Affairs Council, along with other Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

438. Scottish ministers with responsibility for defence, international development or trade will attend the FAC, when connected matters are discussed.

439. The EU Council will prepare for meetings of the European Council. Meetings of the EU Council will in turn be prepared by the various **Council Preparatory Bodies**.[31]

440. The principal preparatory body is **COREPER**. The FAC is under the remit of COREPER II, which Scotland's Permanent Representative to the EU will attend.[32]

441. The **Political and Security Committee** (PSC) considers matters related to the CFSP. Scotland's Representative to the PSC will attend the committee.[33]

442. In Brussels, the coordination of the Government's participation in the Council will be undertaken by Scotland's Permanent Representation to the EU (PermRep). Analysis of the structure of the PermRep is given in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*.[34]

443. Within DEER, the Directorate for Europe will have primary responsibility for EU affairs. The Directorate for Political Affairs will have responsibility for the CFSP.

444. The Department of the Prime Minister and others will be involved as relevant.

445. The Government will interact regularly with the Member State holding the EU Council Presidency. In the fullness of time, Scotland will hold its own inaugural presidency.[35]

3D. Other EU Institutions

446. Outwith the Council, Scotland will engage extensively with the other EU institutions, in respect of foreign affairs and all other policy areas.

447. The Government will interact with the **European External Action Service** (EEAS), the Union's diplomatic service, led by the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy** (HR/VP).[36]

448. The Cabinet Secretary for European and External Relations will speak regularly with the High Representative on all aspects of the EU's foreign policy.

449. The Department will communicate with the EEAS at every level – including between its PermRep and the EEAS headquarters in Brussels, and its diplomatic missions and EU delegations located in the same territories around the world.

450. Members of the Scottish European and External Relations Service may be seconded to the EEAS in support of certain operations, in line with its procedures.

451. The Government will dialogue with the **European Commission** on the full range of its activities, including on economic, social, environment and trade policies.

452. The Prime Minister will speak regularly with the President of the Commission. Cabinet Secretaries will speak regularly with other Members of the Commission.

453. The PermRep will facilitate engagement between all Government Departments and Directorates General of the Commission relative to their policy areas. Those relevant to external affairs will include DG Neighbourhood and Enlargement and DG Trade.

454. The European Commissioner from Scotland could hold a portfolio related to external affairs. While the Government will respect the independence of the Commission, it may interact with the Commissioner in the regular course of their duties.

455. The Government will engage with the **European Parliament** on all its work, with the aim of maintaining a clear understanding of the perspectives in the Parliament.

456. Cabinet Members should speak regularly with Members of the European Parliament, including the Parliament's leadership and chairs of committees.

457. The PermRep will coordinate the Government's engagement with relevant bodies of the Parliament, including committees, delegation and missions. On external affairs, the Committee on Foreign Affairs will be focal point for discussion.

458. While the Government will dialogue with a wide range of members, it will also interact with Scottish Members of the Parliament, who could hold foreign affairs roles.

459. It will be prudent for the Government to make substantial investments in its relations with the Commission, the Parliament and the EEAS from the earliest stage.

460. The Government will work with other relevant EU bodies as appropriate.

3E. Alliances and Partnerships

461. As a constructive EU Member State, the Republic should always consider potential means to improve the Union and further its development.

462. It should remain open-minded to reform initiatives and new programmes. Where it sees deficiencies, it should propose concrete suggestions to address them.

463. Foreign policy is a domain of growth for the Union. Its evolution in the medium term will shape the prospects of the collective external agency of the EU in the world.

464. Given its status as a European small state, Scotland will have opportunities to amplify its global voice through contributing to the EU's foreign policy. The EU is one of the principal defining world actors, alongside the United States and China.

465. However, such influence is not predestined. The Government must work strategically and collaboratively with fellow Member States and other actors.

466. In that regard, it must develop alliances and partnerships to advocate initiatives and drive progress. As a newer member, it will in the formative period mostly join existing Member State alliances. Over time, it will have roles in establishing new alliances.

467. Particular groupings, such as the Like-Minded Initiative, the Hanseatic League, and Nordic-Baltic partnerships, should interest Scotland.[37]

468. Yet, the Republic must be not artificially limited in its alliances. They should not be formed only on the basis of common geography, wealth or ideology.[38]

469. Instead, it should be receptive to any alliance that aligns with its values and interests, advances productive positions and creates common ground – regardless of whether its members seem 'natural partners' for Scotland.

470. The success of the European Union depends upon finding compromise and making progress. Scotland should break limiting moulds and forge innovative partnerships.

471. At the same time, the Government's approach to EU foreign policy must not be simply about advocating its positions – but also about listening to other Member States.

472. Different Member States face particular foreign, defence and security challenges. It will be Scotland's responsibility to consider seriously their concerns, requests and recommendations, in a spirit of mutual support and cooperation.

473. Such support is highly valued and depended on by Member States. Scotland must be fully prepared to take decisive action to assist fellow members in the face of external threats, including where it incurs economic or other costs for doing so.

474. Scotland must always be willing to provide real solidarity to other EU Member States where they require it – as Scotland will receive the same where it requires solidarity. That is the purpose of the European Union.

3F. EU Foreign Policy Debates

475. The Republic should remain fully attuned to ongoing debates related to the future of EU foreign policy. The Government, Parliament and wider society should contribute.

476. Taking into account the views and directions of the Parliament, the Government must formulate positions related to the evolution of EU foreign policy and decision-making.

477. Multiple themes are currently salient in these debates. While they will have evolved by the time Scotland becomes a Member State, it is relevant to take note of them.

478. The single greatest question occupying present discussion is the strategic role of the European Union in this century. Debate on 'European strategic autonomy', spurred in large measure by France, is exploring how the EU can become a more global actor.[39]

479. While the EU already has significant global influence, primarily through its economic and trade policies, its role in traditional foreign policy is considered to be modest.

480. In the measure that this debate still exists once Scotland is an EU member, it should argue for the purposeful development of EU foreign policy, in ways which accord with the values of the Union, and discourage rhetorical initiatives lacking substance.

481. The suggestion is becoming increasingly prevalent that the Union should introduce Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) for certain foreign policy decisions. Currently, most decisions taken under the CFSP require unanimity.[40]

482. Under the associated argument, the EU would be best positioned to respond quickly and meaningfully on foreign policy issues without the need for unanimous positions.

483. Most Member States are also now increasing their defence and security cooperation through Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).[41] Debate on the defence role of the EU and the relationship between the EU and NATO will continue.

484. Interinstitutional relations are another pertinent issue. In various ways, the European Commission President, the High Representative and the European Council President all represent the EU. Their cooperation is essential to the success of EU foreign policy.

4. Multilateral Organisations

485. Multilateralism is a cornerstone of modern international relations. For Scotland, the principle of working cooperatively with others through shared institutions will accord with its values and interests. As a member of the United Nations, the principal global multilateral organisation, Scotland will engage across the UN System. It will also form relationships with NATO, the Council of Europe and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, among others, supported by its multilateral diplomatic missions.

486. This Chapter considers the connection between **Scotland and Multilateralism** and its relationships with the **United Nations**, **North Atlantic Treaty Organisation**, **Global Organisations**, **Regional Organisations** and **Other Organisations**.

4A. Scotland and Multilateralism

487. Multilateralism will be inherent to the fabric of Scotland's external relations.

488. Cooperation, dialogue and partnership with other states and territories of the world will surely be reflected in the foundational values of the Republic.

489. As a European small state, Scotland will rely on multilateralism and the rules-based global system in three interrelated dimensions.

490. First, these principles accord with Scotland's values, including beliefs in democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and in fairness, respect and dignity.

491. Second, they benefit Scotland's interests by creating common standards, reducing national barriers, facilitating trade and investment, fostering international solutions to shared problems and promoting sustainability and sound governance.

492. Third, they reinforce Scotland's sovereignty by embedding large and powerful states into frameworks of rules, offering degrees of equalisation and providing opportunities for other states to influence those rules.

493. Multilateral organisations largely embody this global system. However, for Scotland, multilateralism must not be only a question of subscribing to such organisations.

494. The Republic will support these principles in other ways, including through becoming a member of the European Union, respecting and upholding international law, and conducting its external affairs in a manner consistent with its own values.

495. Support for multilateralism is embedded in the Principles for European and External Relations, which are the basis for all the institutions proposed in the Blueprint.

496. Where it does join organisations, Scotland should resolve to be an active member.

497. Hundreds of international organisations exist today, with different aims, geographical remit, depth of commitment and importance for Scotland.

498. Scotland will not be in a position to apply to join major multilateral organisations until after the point of independence.

499. It should prepare for its future applications, to the extent possible, in the Transition Phase. The Scotland-UK Framework Agreement should facilitate such preparation.

500. During the Foundation Phase, the Republic must prioritise its applications to the most important multilateral organisations for Scotland.

501. A process of staging its wider applications will need to be implemented, to manage the Republic's transition into all the organisations which it will eventually enter.

502. While the Government may propose membership of a multilateral organisation, the Parliament should decide whether Scotland joins that organisation.

503. Accordingly, a principle of **Parliamentary Endorsement** for assuming membership of multilateral organisations should be established.

504. The Parliament should also have roles in managing such memberships as relevant, including through its committees.

505. The Republic should ensure that it is a constructive and purposeful participant in the various organisations of which it will become a member.

506. Within DEER, the Directorate for Multilateral Institutions will have main responsibility for memberships of multilateral organisations.

507. Scottish citizens will be employed by these organisations, potentially at senior level. It becomes ever clearer that Scotland must invest in education and opportunities to produce suitably qualified candidates not only for SEERS, but for wider global roles.

508. It is not feasible to review in detail in the Blueprint all the multilateral organisations which Scotland may eventually join. The most pertinent are considered as follows.

4B. United Nations

509. The United Nations is the bedrock of multilateralism and global cooperation. It brings together every widely recognised state to create international law, address global challenges and advance human progress.

510. Given this paramount role, Scotland will invest significantly in its relationship with and participation at the UN. For Scotland, UN membership will be a foundation for its external relations and a centrepiece of its foreign policy.

511. Membership of the Organisation is also the defining standard of interstate recognition of sovereignty. It will reflect the global recognition of Scotland's status as a state.

512. Scotland should view joining the United Nations as a highest priority. It should make its application as soon as possible after the point of independence.

513. To become a Member State, Scotland must secure a positive recommendation from the UN Security Council, with at least 9 of its 15 members supporting the application and none of the permanent members – the United States, China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom – blocking it.[42]

514. Following the recommendation, Scotland must secure a successful vote in the UN General Assembly, with at least a two-thirds majority of voting members approving the application. If all current 193 Member States voted, at least 129 members would need to support the application for it to pass.

515. Provided that the political circumstances are favourable, it is possible that Scotland could join the United Nations relatively expeditiously after the point of independence.

516. The application process to join the UN demonstrates the continued importance of a constructive relationship between Scotland and the United Kingdom.

517. Consideration should be given to whether the United Nations should be included in some form in the Constitution of the Republic.

518. Fulfilling the Principles for External Relations will require Scotland to build sustained engagement and long-term relationships in the Organisation.

519. The Prime Minister, the DEER Cabinet Secretary and other ministers should regularly participate in the activities of the United Nations.

520. The Counsellors of State should fully include the UN dimension in their coordination and representation of their remit areas.

521. The **United Nations System** comprises a large ecosystem of institutions, agencies, committees and forums. Scotland must ensure that it participates strategically within the UN System to further its particular objectives.

522. Beyond the Principal Organs, the System incorporates a number of **UN Specialised Agencies**.[43] These agencies include UNESCO, the World Health Organisation (WHO), International Labour Organisation (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and most of the World Bank Group are also Specialised Agencies.

523. UN Specialised Agencies have their own distinct application criteria and procedures. It is envisaged that Scotland will eventually apply to join all of these agencies.

524. As a UN Member State, the Republic will appoint a main **Permanent Representative of Scotland to the United Nations**, based at UN Headquarters in New York.

525. It will establish the **Permanent Mission of Scotland to the United Nations New York**, along with further missions and representatives in Geneva and Vienna.

526. The Counsellor of State for Multilateralism will provide strategic advice, coordination and representation in support of Scotland's relations with the United Nations.

527. At official level, the Directorate for Multilateral Institutions will have responsibility for Scotland's participation in the United Nations.

528. The Government will cooperate closely with fellow EU Member States in its work at the UN, including France, the EU's only permanent member of the Security Council.

529. The dynamics of Scotland declaring a candidature for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council is assessed with its diplomatic strategy later in the Blueprint.

4C. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

530. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is the most significant and prominent political and military alliance between states in North America and Europe.[44]

531. It is evident that the prospective relationship between a Scottish state and NATO is contested among some in Scotland.

532. As a state, Scotland will have responsibility for its defence and security. It must take full account of its position and requirements to ensure the integrity of the Republic.

533. It must then take account of the defence and security considerations of its allies, and particularly those of its eventual fellow EU Member States.

534. It should also have regard to the implications of its defence and security policies for aspects of its European and external relations, including prospects for success in the European Union and bilateral relationships with important partners.

535. Moreover, the Republic must note its geostrategic environment. Its vantage towards the High North will be of interest to competing major powers with different values.

536. Neutrality is an outmoded concept. It is not suited to a modern world where debates over institutions and values require states to respond, not to declare disinterest.

537. Scotland has never been neutral and it could hardly become a 'bridge' between sides in the competition of value systems in which it has a decided position.

538. It should note that Denmark, Iceland and Norway combine NATO and Nordic values.

539. The evident conclusion of this succession of reasoning is that Scotland should join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

540. Under the principle of Parliamentary Endorsement, the Parliament should determine the circumstances of Scotland's application for NATO membership.

541. Scotland could also hold a **NATO Membership Referendum** to confirm whether the electorate supports joining the Alliance.

542. Provided that NATO membership is endorsed, the Republic will proceed to make its application under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.[45]

543. NATO and Scotland should agree relevant interim defence cooperation measures.

544. Scotland should ascertain whether the Alliance will consider an expeditious pathway to membership for it, in view of its prior participation through the former UK.

545. Unanimity would be required among all the current 30 Member Countries, including the United Kingdom, for Scotland's application to be approved.

546. The application process to join NATO also demonstrates the continued importance of a constructive relationship between Scotland and the United Kingdom.

547. Joint cooperation in NATO will be an important dimension of the Republic's wider bilateral relationships, including with fellow EU members and the United States.

548. Being situated in both sides of EU-NATO cooperation will also benefit Scotland, given the growing EU attention and investment in the future development of the CSDP.

549. As with all its memberships of multilateral organisations, Scotland will both receive benefits from and make contributions to NATO.

550. The Republic should consider its potential contributions to the Alliance, including in relation to cybersecurity, disinformation and hybrid threats.

551. As a NATO Member Country, the Republic will appoint a **Permanent Representative of Scotland to the North Atlantic Council**, based at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

552. It will establish the **Permanent Delegation of Scotland to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation**, with staff from DEER and the Department of Defence.

553. The Depute Chief Counsellor and Counsellor of State for National Security will provide strategic advice, coordination and representation on Scotland's relations with NATO.

554. At official level, for DEER, the Directorate for Political Affairs will have responsibility for Scotland's participation in NATO.

555. Productive NATO membership will depend on harmonious cooperation between the Department of European and External Relations and the Department of Defence.

556. Full analysis of the defence and security institutions of an independent Scottish state, including the role of NATO, should be undertaken separately.

4D. Global Organisations

557. Many other multilateral organisations form part of the global system.

558. In considering its prospective memberships and the timeline of its applications, the Republic should have regard to multiple factors.

559. It should assess the relevance and importance of an organisation to Scotland.

560. It should determine Scotland's ability to fulfil the obligations and enjoy the rights of membership of the organisation, at the point of application and point of accession.

561. It should make such assessments in line with the prudent management of Scotland's portfolio of multilateral organisation memberships during the Foundation Phase.

562. Several global multilateral organisations exercise important roles in world economic, financial, monetary and trade governance.

563. The World Trade Organization (WTO), World Customs Organization (WCO) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) are notable institutions in those respects.

564. It would be highly sensible for Scotland to join these organisations. In doing so, the Republic must take into account its future obligations as an EU Member State.

565. The character of Scotland's participation in the WTO in particular will change once it joins the European Union, given that the Common Commercial Policy is an exclusive competence of the Union. The European Commission engages in the WTO for the EU.

566. It is probable that Scotland will become a member of most other organisations by the time it completes its EU accession process.

567. The Government should engage with the European Commission at the earliest stage to understand the implications of EU accession and membership for its relationships with multilateral organisations.[46]

568. Other notable global institutions range from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

569. Scotland will surely join such organisations, many of which have different varieties of relationships with the United Nations.

570. Given the UN offices in Geneva and Vienna, and the high concentration of important international organisations in these cities, Scotland will need a diplomatic presence.

571. The Republic will appoint **Permanent Representatives** in Geneva and Vienna.

572. It will establish the **Permanent Mission of Scotland to the United Nations and the International Organisations in Geneva** and the **Permanent Mission of Scotland to the United Nations and the International Organisations in Vienna**.

573. In all these organisations, Scotland should seek to cooperate with EU Member States on policies, positions and initiatives, wherever possible.

4E. Regional Organisations

574. Some multilateral organisations are structured on the basis of shared geography and aspirational values among its members.

575. The Council of Europe (CoE) is a principal unifying organisation of Europe and a pillar for human rights, democracy and the rule of law on our continent.[47]

576. Joining the Council will symbolise Scotland's commitment to those values. It will also be a prerequisite to become a member of the European Union.

577. Scotland should apply for membership expeditiously after the point of independence.

578. As a Member State of the Council of Europe, the Republic will appoint a **Permanent Representative of Scotland to the Council of Europe**, based in Strasbourg.

579. It will create the **Permanent Representation of Scotland to the Council of Europe**.

580. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a notable regional security body, with a membership spanning North America, Europe and Asia.[48]

581. Membership of the OSCE will reflect Scotland's commitment to democracy, the rule of law and human rights. It should apply for membership as soon as possible.

582. As a OSCE Participating State, the Republic will appoint a **Permanent Representative of Scotland to the OSCE**, based in Vienna.

583. It will establish the **Permanent Mission of Scotland to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**.

584. The Counsellor of State for Democracy and Human Rights will offer strategic advice, coordination and representation on relations with the Council of Europe and OSCE.

585. The Nordic Council will be important to Scotland for regional and global cooperation.

586. While it would be unusual to consider Scotland a candidate for membership, it should seek a **Nordic-Scotland Strategic Partnership** with the Council to deepen links.

587. The Counsellor of State for the High North and Polar Regions will provide strategic advice, coordination and representation on relations with the Nordic Council.

588. The British-Irish Council (BIC) is currently a regional organisation bringing together Ireland, the UK, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the UK Crown dependencies.

589. In future, the BIC could continue as a primarily bilateral forum or could be converted into a primarily trilateral organisation, such as the **Common Islands Council** (CIC). The CIC could also be created as a separate organisation from the BIC.

590. The Counsellor of State for Common Islands Relations will provide strategic advice, coordination and representation on trilateral relations with Ireland and the UK.

591. Full analysis of the institutions supporting Common Islands relations after the point of independence of Scotland should be undertaken separately.

4F. Other Organisations

592. Some multilateral organisations are structured on the basis of similar policies and attributes of its members and potential members.

593. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a notable example, focused on policy coordination and improvement. Scotland should join the OECD, given its role in global agenda-setting. It is located in Paris, as is UNESCO.[49]

594. As an OECD and UNESCO member, the Republic will appoint a **Permanent Delegate of Scotland to the OECD** and a **Permanent Delegate of Scotland to UNESCO**, based in Paris. The two positions will normally be held concurrently by the same individual.

595. It will establish the **Permanent Delegation of Scotland to the OECD and UNESCO**.

596. The Counsellor of State for Multilateralism will provide strategic advice, coordination and representation on relations with the OECD and UNESCO.

597. It is envisaged that Scotland will not join the Commonwealth of Nations.

598. The Republic will engage with the United Kingdom through their bilateral relationship and in the frameworks for Common Islands relations.

599. It will engage with the other members of the Commonwealth through more modern and progressive institutions, including the United Nations.

600. Multilateral missions in the diplomatic network are considered later in the Blueprint.

5. Diplomatic Missions

601. Scotland's diplomatic missions will represent the values and interests of the state in other states and at international organisations. Its Embassies, Consulates General and Multilateral Missions will each serve specific purposes. Given that Scotland will not have missions in every state, the design of the Scottish diplomatic network must be strategic. The Department will build systems for the effective management of its missions. The full establishment of the network will be phased over a period time.

602. This Chapter sets out the **Mission Functions**, **Mission Profiles** and **Mission Design** of Scotland's diplomatic missions, and the structure of the global Scottish **Diplomatic Network**, its **Network Management** and **Network Development**.

5A. Mission Functions

603. The Republic of Scotland will be represented in the states of the European Union, in the states of the world and at multilateral organisations by its diplomatic missions.

604. While public perception may often be that diplomacy is a business of ceremony, it is not. Scotland's diplomatic missions will be operations of professionals dedicated to furthering the values and interests of the Republic around the world on a daily basis.

605. Its missions will connect the Government to ongoing political, economic and social developments of consequence in states and at international organisations.

606. Diplomacy has evolved significantly over recent decades, and even in recent years. Global forums provide spaces for political leaders to interact directly. Technological innovation has made it feasible to conduct digital diplomacy directly with publics.

607. Despite the changes in society, it will be essential for Scotland to make considerable investments in the establishment and development of its diplomatic network.

608. In the Foundation Phase, this network will be instrumental in building the Republic's new reputation as a state. In fact, an ambitious diplomatic profile will be a necessity.

609. As a European small state, Scotland will not be in a position to situate a diplomatic mission in every state or nearly every state with which it has diplomatic relations.

610. Instead, the Republic must build a strategic and bespoke diplomatic network which is best suited to representing the state effectively in the rest of Europe and the world.

611. At the same time, the extent of Scotland's diplomatic network will not define that of its diplomatic relations. Scotland will have formal relationships with other states and territories, including through side-accreditation from neighbouring missions.

612. Nevertheless, the opening of a Scottish diplomatic mission is a statement of interest and commitment in developing connections with the relevant partner.

613. In the creation of the **Scottish Diplomatic Network**, state-to-state bilateral relations and participation in multilateral organisations, the Republic must have regard to the relevant aspects of international law, including treaties to which it may accede.

614. In particular, it must note the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.[50]

615. The missions in the network will one of two characters: bilateral or multilateral. The purpose, design and functions of the mission will depend upon this character.

616. An essential distinction must also be made between bilateral diplomatic missions in EU Member States and those in non-EU states.

617. Scottish diplomatic missions will undertake a complex variety of different functions, according to their design and remit, potentially including political affairs, economic affairs, defence and security, trade and investment, and education and culture.

618. They will engage with governments, business, civil society, citizens, the diaspora and the public. Bilateral missions will provide consular services.

619. Bilateral missions in EU Member States will also engage specifically in relation to the policies and institutions of the Union.

620. Across all these domains, SEERS members and colleagues will create connections, find opportunities and build partnerships. They will work in support of the Principles for European and External Relations and the values of the state.

621. Before opening missions, the Government must give full consideration to all relevant aspects of their premises, including their location, size, security and future growth.

622. Scottish diplomatic missions will be operated by a combination of **Posted Diplomatic Staff** (PDS) from Scotland and **Locally-Recruited Staff** (LRS) from the host territory.

623. PDS members will occupy diplomatic posts, and LRS members non-diplomatic posts.

624. In line with DEER principles, missions should make regular use of local languages.

625. Each mission will have a custom **Mission Business Plan** and associated objectives.

626. It will be essential to ensure good interconnectivity between individual missions and the Department, and between individual missions in particular contexts.

627. Due to their substantial differences, no direct comparisons can be made between the Scottish Diplomatic Network of the Republic and the current Scottish Government's paradiplomatic network of offices. Expertise should be transferred where relevant.

628. Scotland will not be able to formally establish or activate its diplomatic network until after the point of independence. It should undertake all possible preparations in the Transition Phase, which the Scotland-UK Framework Agreement should facilitate.

629. After the point of independence, its multilateral missions will evolve as the Republic develops its relationships. In particular, its representation to the European Union will reflect its relative status with the Union at the time.

630. As a non-member, the Republic will maintain a Mission of Scotland to the European Union. Once a member, this mission will become the Permanent Representation of Scotland to the European Union. Its functions will therefore change over time.[51]

631. Scottish missions will often form part of the respective diplomatic corps or consular corps of missions in the host territory, which regularly serve as informal networks.

632. Outwith the EU, Scottish missions will cooperate closely with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States and the EU Delegations operated by the EEAS.

5B. Mission Profiles

633. The Scottish Diplomatic Network will have four classes of mission profile: **Embassies**, **Consulates General**, **Multilateral Missions** and **Other Missions**.

634. Each will be led by a **Head of Mission** and most will have a **Depute Head of Mission**.

Embassies

635. The Embassies of Scotland will serve as the principal representations between the Republic and states of the world with which it has diplomatic relations.

636. An Embassy will be located in the capital or the designated capital of the host state. It will often be centrally situated, perhaps in proximity to embassies of other states.

637. The Head of Mission of an Embassy will have the title of *Ambassador*.

638. An Embassy will be styled in English and Gaelic, as: **Embassy of Scotland | Àmbasaid na h-Alba [European Union | Aonadh Eòrpach]**.

639. The prototype wordmark of an Embassy of Scotland is as follows.

EMBASSY OF SCOTLAND
ÀMBASAID NA H-ALBA

EUROPEAN UNION
AONADH EÒRPACH

640. It is not currently common for the embassies of EU Member States to make such clear reference to the European Union in their presentation. However, this approach will align with Scotland's commitment to the Union and perhaps begin a new trend.

641. Embassies will fly the Saltire and European flag together at the exterior and interior of their premises, as will all Government buildings and offices worldwide.

642. In the period before Scotland joins the EU, named references to the Union will not be included in its wordmark or presentation.

643. The placement of English and Gaelic should be reversed for the Embassy of Scotland in Ireland, in honour of the shared linguistic and cultural heritage of both states.

644. Embassies will generally provide diplomatic representation on all relevant aspects of political, economic and social affairs, and the full range of consular services.

645. It will be expected that the Head of Mission of an Embassy will normally hold the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary (SEERS-7) or higher.

646. Positions as Head of Mission at certain Embassies could be designated for those with the rank of Assistant Secretary-General (SEERS-8) or higher.

Consulates General

647. The Consulates General of Scotland will serve as secondary representations between the Republic and states of the world with which it has diplomatic relations.

648. A Consulate General will normally be located in a major city beyond the capital of the host state. It will often be positioned with regard to an important city or territory.

649. The Head of Mission of a Consulate General will have the title of *Consul General*.

650. A Consulate General will be styled in English and Gaelic, as: **Consulate General of Scotland | Àrd-chonsalachd na h-Alba [European Union | Aonadh Eòrpach]**.

651. The prototype wordmark of a Consulate General of Scotland is as follows.

> **CONSULATE GENERAL OF SCOTLAND**
> **ÀRD-CHONSALACHD NA H-ALBA**
>
> EUROPEAN UNION
> AONADH EÒRPACH

652. With they will have the necessary autonomy, Consulates General will operate under the respective Embassy in their state, regardless of geography. It is envisaged that Scotland will not maintain *Consulates*, in contrast to *Consulates General*.

653. Consulates General will often provide diplomatic representation on certain aspects of political, economic and social affairs, and a variable range of consular services.

654. The specific profile of a Consulate General will depend on its structural relationship with its Embassy, the dynamics of its host location and its particular objectives.

655. It will be expected that the Head of Mission of a Consulate General will normally hold the rank of at least Counsellor (SEERS-6).

656. Positions as Head of Mission at certain Consulates General may be available to those with the rank of First Secretary (SEERS-5).

Multilateral Missions

657. The Multilateral Missions of Scotland will serve as the representations of the Republic at the European Union and multilateral organisations of which it is a member.

658. A Multilateral Mission will be located in the city hosting the offices of the multilateral organisation in question. These missions will all be in Europe and the United States.

659. The title of a Head of Mission at a Multilateral Mission will depend on the convention associated with that organisation. It will normally be in the form of either *Permanent Representative* or *Permanent Delegate*.

660. Such Heads of Mission will also be styled as *Ambassador*.

661. The style of a Multilateral Mission will also depend on the associated convention.

662. For instance, Scotland's Permanent Representation to the EU will be styled in English, French, Dutch and Gaelic, as: **Permanent Representation of Scotland to the European Union | Représentation permanente de l'Écosse auprès de l'Union européenne | Permanente Vertegenwoordiging van Schotland bij de Europese Unie | Buan-riochdaireachd na h-Alba don Aonadh Eòrpach**.

663. The prototype wordmark of the Permanent Representation is as follows.

PERMANENT REPRESENTATION OF SCOTLAND TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
REPRÉSENTATION PERMANENTE DE L'ÉCOSSE AUPRÈS DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE
PERMANENTE VERTEGENWOORDIGING VAN SCHOTLAND BIJ DE EUROPESE UNIE
BUAN-RIOCHDAIREACHD NA H-ALBA DON AONADH EÒRPACH

664. The PermRep will in fact host three diplomats styled as *Ambassador* – the Permanent Representative, Depute Permanent Representative and Representative to the PSC.

665. Moreover, Scotland's Permanent Mission to the UN New York will be styled in English, French and Gaelic, as: **Permanent Mission of Scotland to the United Nations New York | Mission permanente de l'Écosse auprès des Nations Unies à New York | Buan-riochdaireachd na h-Alba dha na Dùthchannan Aonaichte aig New York**.

666. The prototype wordmark of the Permanent Mission is as follows.

> **PERMANENT MISSION OF SCOTLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK**
> **MISSION PERMANENTE DE L'ÉCOSSE AUPRÈS DES NATIONS UNIES À NEW YORK**
> **BUAN-RIOCHDAIREACHD NA H-ALBA DHA NA DÙTHCHANNAN AONAICHTE AIG NEW YORK**

667. Multilateral Missions will facilitate Scotland's membership of the EU and multilateral organisations, providing representation within the structures of their institutions.

668. The specific profile of a Multilateral Mission will depend on the organisation, including the rights and responsibilities of membership and its importance to Scotland.

669. It will be expected that the Head of Mission of a Multilateral Mission will hold the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary (SEERS-7) or higher.

670. Positions as Head of Mission at certain Multilateral Missions should be designated for those with the rank of Assistant Secretary-General (SEERS-8) or higher.

Other Missions

671. Scotland will have other missions which do not fit into a particular category.

672. Such missions will be located in the place most relevant to perform their activities.

673. The Head of Mission will be titled as suitable to the individual mission.

674. The functions of such missions and the habitual minimum rank of the Head of Mission will depend on the purposes and circumstances of those missions.

675. It is envisaged that the Republic will maintain one such mission – the Representative Office of Scotland in Palestine.

676. Some states operate further types of missions, such as Innovation Centres, Hubs and Special Offices. They normally have a particular trade or investment focus.

677. While Scotland should remain open-minded to innovation in diplomacy, its efforts in building the Scottish Diplomatic Network should be concentrated on its core portfolio of traditional missions, especially in the Foundation Phase. It will also be sensible to co-locate trade and investment activity within full diplomatic missions.

678. Another class of mission is **Honorary Consulates**, through which a private individual resident in a host territory would act as *Honorary Consul* on a voluntary basis.

679. Honorary Consuls would have some connection to Scotland, whether by citizenship, genealogy or affinity, and often be a citizen of the host state. They would offer trade representation and emergency consular services to Scottish citizens and residents.

680. Such Honorary Consulates would be situated in locations without an active Scottish diplomatic mission. In that regard, they would extend the nominal Scottish presence.

681. Given Scotland's global diaspora, it is conceivable that many individuals will wish to become Honorary Consuls for Scotland in states around the world.

682. Nevertheless, in the formative years of the Foundation Phase, the Department will be focused on establishing the regular Diplomatic Network. Honorary Consulates should therefore not be opened during that period and until DEER capacity is available.

683. When it is appropriate to consider Honorary Consulates, the Department must create the necessary systems, including in relation to recruitment, vetting and security.

5C. Mission Design

684. The organisation design of every Scottish diplomatic mission will be constructed for its specific profile, functions, location and importance.

685. In that regard, while the designs of comparable missions will have similarities, each will be tailored for its circumstances, at the point of creation and over time.

686. Accordingly, the size and personnel responsibilities of missions will also be variable.

687. As a European small state, Scotland will mostly operate small-sized missions. It will have some medium-sized missions and a few large-sized missions.

688. For instance, it is probable that many Embassies of Scotland will have around three diplomatic (PDS) personnel, supported by non-diplomatic (LRS) personnel.

689. Some Consulates General of Scotland will have as few as one member of diplomatic personnel, supported by non-diplomatic personnel.

690. Large bilateral missions will be maintained with strategic partners for Scotland, such as France, Germany, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.

691. Large multilateral missions will be maintained at strategic institutions for Scotland, mainly the European Union, the United Nations and NATO.

692. As an example, the Embassy of Scotland in Germany could have a staff of 25.

693. The Embassy of Scotland in Germany could at one time be structured as follows.

Embassy of Scotland in the Federal Republic of Germany **Mission Design**		
SECTION	**TITLE**	**RANK**
Leadership	Ambassador Head of Mission	Assistant Secretary-General
	Depute Head of Mission Head of Political Affairs	Minister Plenipotentiary
Political Affairs	EU Affairs Officer	First Secretary
	Political Affairs Officer	First Secretary
Economic Affairs	Head of Economic Affairs	Counsellor
	Economic Affairs Officer	Second Secretary
Defence	Defence Attaché	Colonel (SRDF)
	Defence Officer	Second Secretary
Trade	Head of Trade (STC)	First Secretary
	Trade Officer (3)	Second Secretary
Cultural Affairs	Head of Cultural Affairs	First Secretary
	Cultural Affairs Officer	Locally-Recruited Officer
Consular Affairs	Head of Consular Affairs	Second Secretary
	Consular Assistant (2)	Third Secretary
Communications	Head of Communications	Second Secretary
	Communications Officer	Locally-Recruited Officer
Administration	Head of Administration	Second Secretary
	Administration Officer (2)	Locally-Recruited Officer
	Administration Assistant (2)	Locally-Recruited Assistant
	Reception Assistant	Locally-Recruited Assistant

694. This mission features an Assistant Secretary-General (SEERS-8) as Head of Mission and Minister Plenipotentiary (SEERS-7) as Depute Head of Mission, both high-ranking diplomats, due to its size and strategic importance to Scotland.

695. The mission design includes Heads of Section and Officers. In practice, officers may be titled with their rank – such as *First Secretary, EU Affairs*.

696. While mission sections and personnel titles will be designed according to the mission requirements, it is important to maintain a degree of comparability with titles. Ranks and titles are often used to identify similarly-ranked counterparts for interaction.

697. A general design of the Permanent Representation of Scotland to the European Union is detailed in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*.[52]

5D. Diplomatic Network

698. The Scottish Diplomatic Network will consist of bilateral and multilateral missions.

699. As a European small state, it would be neither feasible nor affordable for Scotland to maintain a bilateral diplomatic mission in all current 193 UN Member States.

700. Instead, it must build a diplomatic network of missions suited to its circumstances.

701. The Scottish Bilateral Diplomatic Network could be visually represented as follows.

REPUBLIC OF SCOTLAND | POBLACHD NA H-ALBA
NETWORK OF BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS



Shaded territories indicate the placement of a bilateral diplomatic mission of Scotland

702. This Diplomatic Network has been designed based on considerations including:

- Scotland's status as a member of the European Union
- Strategic bilateral partners for Scotland
- Major global powers and regional powers
- States with significant Scottish diaspora communities
- States which are partners in development and cooperation
- Scotland's strategic interest in the High North and Arctic

703. The Republic's diplomatic missions will be divided into two classes. The **EU** Missions will be located within the EU. The **EX** Missions will be located outwith the EU.

704. For the bilateral network, the EU Missions are organised alphabetically according to the nominated EU language. The EX Missions are organised alphabetically in English.

705. Scotland's Network of Bilateral Diplomatic Missions could be designed as follows.

Republic of Scotland
Diplomatic Missions (Bilateral)

SIGN	MISSION	LOCATION
	EUROPEAN UNION	
EU-1	Embassy of Scotland in the Kingdom of Belgium	Brussels
EU-2	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Bulgaria	Sophia
EU-3	Embassy of Scotland in the Czech Republic	Prague
EU-4	Embassy of Scotland in the Kingdom of Denmark	Copenhagen
EU-4A	Consulate General of Scotland – Tórshavn*	Tórshavn
EU-4B	Consulate General of Scotland – Nuuk*	Nuuk
EU-5	Embassy of Scotland in the Federal Republic of Germany	Berlin
EU-5A	Consulate General of Scotland – Munich	Munich
EU-5B	Consulate General of Scotland – Frankfurt	Frankfurt
EU-6	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Estonia	Tallinn
EU-7	Embassy of Scotland in Ireland	Dublin
EU-8	Embassy of Scotland in the Hellenic Republic	Athens
EU-9	Embassy of Scotland in the Kingdom of Spain	Madrid
EU-9A	Consulate General of Scotland – Barcelona	Barcelona
EU-9B	Consulate General of Scotland – Bilbao	Bilbao
EU-10	Embassy of Scotland in the French Republic	Paris
EU-10A	Consulate General of Scotland – Marseille	Marseille
EU-11	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Croatia	Zagreb
EU-12	Embassy of Scotland in the Italian Republic	Rome
EU-12A	Consulate General of Scotland – Milan	Milan
EU-13	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Cyprus	Nicosia
EU-14	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Latvia	Riga
EU-15	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Lithuania	Vilnius
EU-16	Embassy of Scotland in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg	Luxembourg
EU-17	Embassy of Scotland in Hungary	Budapest
EU-18	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Malta	Valletta
EU-19	Embassy of Scotland in the Kingdom of the Netherlands	The Hague
EU-19A	Consulate General of Scotland – Amsterdam	Amsterdam
EU-20	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Austria	Vienna
EU-21	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Poland	Warsaw
EU-22	Embassy of Scotland in the Portuguese Republic	Lisbon
EU-23	Embassy of Scotland in Romania	Bucharest
EU-24	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Slovenia	Ljubljana
EU-25	Embassy of Scotland in the Slovak Republic	Bratislava

EU-26	Embassy of Scotland in the Kingdom of Sweden	Stockholm
EU-27	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Finland	Helsinki
NON-EUROPEAN UNION		
EX-1	Embassy of Scotland in the PDR of Algeria	Algiers
EX-2	Embassy of Scotland in the Argentine Republic	Buenos Aires
EX-3	Embassy of Scotland in Australia	Canberra
EX-3A	Consulate General of Scotland – Sydney	Sydney
EX-4	Embassy of Scotland in the Federative Republic of Brazil	Brasilia
EX-4A	Consulate General of Scotland – São Paulo	São Paulo
EX-5	Embassy of Scotland in Canada	Ottawa
EX-5A	Consulate General of Scotland – Montréal	Montréal
EX-5B	Consulate General of Scotland – Toronto	Toronto
EX-5C	Consulate General of Scotland – Vancouver	Vancouver
EX-6	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Chile	Santiago
EX-7	Embassy of Scotland in the People's Republic of China	Beijing
EX-7A	Consulate General of Scotland – Shanghai	Shanghai
EX-7B	Consulate General of Scotland – Hong Kong	Hong Kong
EX-8	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Colombia	Bogota
EX-9	Embassy of Scotland in the Arab Republic of Egypt	Cairo
EX-10	Embassy of Scotland in the FDR of Ethiopia	Addis Ababa
EX-11	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Ghana	Accra
EX-12	Embassy of Scotland in Iceland	Reykjavik
EX-13	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of India	New Delhi
EX-13A	Consulate General of Scotland – Mumbai	Mumbai
EX-14	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Indonesia	Jakarta
EX-15	Embassy of Scotland in the State of Israel	Tel Aviv
EX-16	Representative Office of Scotland in Palestine	Ramallah
EX-17	Embassy of Scotland in Jamaica	Kingston
EX-18	Embassy of Scotland in Japan	Tokyo
EX-19	Embassy of Scotland in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	Amman
EX-20	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Kenya	Nairobi
EX-21	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Korea	Seoul
EX-22	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Malawi	Lilongwe
EX-23	Embassy of Scotland in Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur
EX-24	Embassy of Scotland in the United Mexican States	Mexico City
EX-25	Embassy of Scotland in the Kingdom of Morocco	Rabat
EX-26	Embassy of Scotland in New Zealand	Wellington
EX-27	Embassy of Scotland in the Federal Republic of Nigeria	Abuja
EX-28	Embassy of Scotland in the Kingdom of Norway	Oslo
EX-29	Embassy of Scotland in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan	Islamabad
EX-30	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of the Philippines	Manila
EX-31	Embassy of Scotland in the Russian Federation	Moscow
EX-32	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Rwanda	Kigali
EX-33	Embassy of Scotland in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Riyadh
EX-34	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Senegal	Dakar

EX-35	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Singapore	Singapore
EX-36	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of South Africa	Pretoria
EX-37	Embassy of Scotland in the Swiss Confederation	Bern
EX-38	Embassy of Scotland in the United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam
EX-39	Embassy of Scotland in the Kingdom of Thailand	Bangkok
EX-40	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Turkey	Ankara
EX-40A	Consulate General of Scotland – Istanbul	Istanbul
EX-41	Embassy of Scotland in Ukraine	Kiev
EX-42	Embassy of Scotland in the United Arab Emirates	Abu Dhabi
EX-43	Embassy of Scotland in the United Kingdom of EWNI	London
EX-43A	Consulate General of Scotland – Manchester	Manchester
EX-43B	Consulate General of Scotland – Newcastle	Newcastle
EX-43C	Consulate General of Scotland – Cardiff	Cardiff
EX-43D	Consulate General of Scotland – Belfast	Belfast
EX-44	Embassy of Scotland in the United States of America	Washington DC
EX-44A	Consulate General of Scotland – Boston	Boston
EX-44B	Consulate General of Scotland – New York	New York
EX-44C	Consulate General of Scotland – Chicago	Chicago
EX-44D	Consulate General of Scotland – Atlanta	Atlanta
EX-44E	Consulate General of Scotland – Houston	Houston
EX-44F	Consulate General of Scotland – Denver	Denver
EX-44G	Consulate General of Scotland – San Francisco	San Francisco
EX-45	Embassy of Scotland in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam	Hanoi
EX-46	Embassy of Scotland in the Republic of Zambia	Lusaka

* The Faroe Islands and Greenland are not part of the European Union

706. Scotland's Network of Multilateral Diplomatic Missions could be designed as follows.

Republic of Scotland
Diplomatic Missions (Multilateral)

SIGN	MISSION	LOCATION
EU-A1	Permanent Representation of Scotland to the European Union	Brussels
EX-A1	Permanent Mission of Scotland to the United Nations New York	New York
EX-A2	Permanent Mission of Scotland to the UN and the International Organisations in Geneva	Geneva
EX-A3	Permanent Mission of Scotland to the UN and the International Organisations in Vienna	Vienna
EX-A4	Permanent Delegation of Scotland to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	Brussels
EX-A5	Permanent Representation of Scotland to the Council of Europe	Strasbourg
EX-A6	Permanent Mission of Scotland to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	Vienna
EX-A7	Permanent Delegation of Scotland to the OECD and UNESCO	Paris

707. For the multilateral network, missions are named as they will be once Scotland has joined the EU or the relevant multilateral organisation.

708. Certain bilateral and multilateral missions in the same city may be co-located.

709. Scotland's Diplomatic Network could be summarised as follows.

Republic of Scotland
Diplomatic Network

MISSION PROFILE	EU	NON-EU	TOTAL
Embassies	27	45	72
Consulates General	9	20	29
Multilateral Missions	1	7	8
Other Missions	0	1	1
NETWORK TOTALS	37	73	110

710. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will operate 110 diplomatic missions. It will maintain an Embassy in 72 of the current 193 UN Member States.

711. Scotland will maintain an Embassy in every Member State of the European Union.

712. Around one-third of Scotland's diplomatic network will be located within the EU and around two-thirds will be located outwith the EU.

713. The proposed footprint is a reasonable representation of the network of diplomatic missions of a Scottish state. Other configurations are possible.

714. It is consistent in general terms with the diplomatic networks of the four European states of comparison – Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Norway.

715. It is particularly consistent with respect to embassies, given that Denmark, Finland and Ireland all have around 70 embassies at present.

716. The proposed footprint differs with respect to consulates general, as Scotland would have around 15 more consulates general than the comparison states.

717. This differentiation is purposeful. Scotland will use the opening of consulates general in specific major EU non-capital cities and in the United States and Canada to deepen its bilateral relationships with strategic partners.

718. In combination with the rest of its diplomatic approach, these further missions will enable Scotland to expeditiously enhance connections with important states for the Republic, while also building sustainable bilateral foundations for the long term.

719. Scotland's diplomatic strategy is assessed later in the Blueprint.

5E. Network Management

720. The Department must develop suitable procedures for the effective management of the Scottish Diplomatic Network and each of its prospective 110 missions.

721. Diplomatic missions will report in the first instance to the **Reporting Directorate** that is assigned management responsibility for that mission.

722. The Department's **Mission Reporting Directorates** could be structured as follows.

Department of European and External Relations
Mission Reporting Directorates

DIRECTORATE	MISSIONS	TOTALS
Europe	EMB Brussels · EMB Sophia · EMB Prague · EMB Copenhagen CG Tórshavn · CG Nuuk · EMB Berlin · CG Munich CG Frankfurt · EMB Tallinn · EMB Dublin · EMB Athens EMB Madrid · CG Barcelona · CG Bilbao · EMB Paris CG Marseille · EMB Zagreb · EMB Rome · CG Milan EMB Nicosia · EMB Riga · EMB Vilnius · EMB Luxembourg EMB Budapest · EMB Valletta · EMB The Hague CG Amsterdam · EMB Vienna · EMB Warsaw · EMB Lisbon EMB Bucharest · EMB Ljubljana · EMB Bratislava EMB Stockholm · EMB Helsinki · PR European Union | EMB Reykjavik · EMB Oslo · EMB Moscow · EMB Bern EMB Ankara · CG Istanbul · EMB Kiev · EMB London CG Manchester · CG Newcastle · CG Cardiff · CG Belfast	34 EMB 14 CG 1 MULT **49 TOTAL**
Political Affairs	PD NATO	1 MULT **1 TOTAL**
Multilateral Institutions	PM UN New York · PM UN/IO Geneva · PM UN/IO Vienna PR COE · PM OSCE · PD OECD-UNESCO	6 MULT **6 TOTAL**
Americas	EMB Buenos Aires · EMB Brasilia · CG São Paulo · EMB Ottawa CG Montréal · CG Toronto · CG Vancouver · EMB Santiago EMB Bogota · EMB Kingston · EMB Mexico City EMB Washington DC · CG Boston · CG New York · CG Chicago CG Atlanta · CG Houston · CG Denver · CG San Francisco	8 EMB 11 CG **19 TOTAL**
Africa and Middle East	EMB Algiers · EMB Cairo · EMB Addis Ababa · EMB Accra EMB Tel Aviv · REP Ramallah · EMB Amman · EMB Nairobi EMB Lilongwe · EMB Rabat · EMB Abuja · EMB Kigali EMB Riyadh · EMB Dakar · EMB Pretoria EMB Dar es Salaam · EMB Lusaka	16 EMB 1 REP **17 TOTAL**
Asia and Pacific	EMB Canberra · CG Sydney · EMB Beijing · CG Shanghai CG Hong Kong · EMB New Delhi · CG Mumbai · EMB Jakarta EMB Tokyo · EMB Seoul · EMB Kuala Lumpur · EMB Wellington EMB Islamabad · EMB Manila · EMB Singapore · EMB Bangkok EMB Abu Dhabi · EMB Hanoi	14 EMB 4 CG **18 TOTAL**

723. Bilateral missions will report to their respective Area Directorate.

724. The Permanent Representation to the EU will report to the Directorate for Europe and the Permanent Delegation to NATO to the Directorate for Political Affairs. All other multilateral missions will report to the Directorate for Multilateral Institutions.

725. Missions will submit regular reports to their Reporting Directorate.

726. For bilateral missions, conventional practice might be a weekly report of political and wider developments in the mission territory and accompanying analysis.

727. For multilateral missions, its reporting will depend on the nature of the organisation. For the EU and UN missions, pertinent matters may arise on a daily or hourly basis.

728. Wider coordination mechanisms, including regional Heads of Mission meetings, will form part of the Department's management practice.

729. Evaluation and assessment of Scottish diplomatic missions will be undertaken by the Reporting Directorate, the Department's Internal Audit Division, the Special Scrutiny Committee and other independent audit and evaluation authorities.

730. Beyond the Reporting Directorates, other Directorates will be engaged on the aspects of diplomatic mission operations related to their remit areas.

731. For instance, the Directorate for Trade will be involved in trade and investment work in missions and the Directorate for Operations will provide services to missions.

732. Appropriate coordination between the Directorates in such regards will be essential to sound management and should be performed by relevant leadership.

733. The Secretary-General, Depute Secretary-General and Departmental Council will be involved in the management of the diplomatic network as their roles demand.

734. The success of diplomatic missions will require excellent central coordination. By its nature, a diplomatic network must have something to which it will connect back.

735. Department headquarters must support missions, relay their intelligence and ensure that their work fits into the wider operations of the Department and the Government.

736. The Department, including Departmental Ministers, will make decisions in relation to side-accreditations to states in which the Republic does not have an Embassy.

737. The inaugural Scottish Diplomatic Network established in the Foundation Phase will continue to evolve in the years ahead.

738. It is probable that the diplomatic footprint will change in some measure over time. Different circumstances may lead to different assessments of diplomatic investment.

739. At some point in the future, the Republic could close existing missions or open new ones. The Government will normally take such decisions.

740. The Parliament may desire a role in authorising the opening or the closing of Scottish diplomatic missions. The subject may be referenced in some form in the Constitution.

741. Given the geographical size of the United States, its strategic importance to Scotland and the depth of the diplomatic investment, special arrangements will be necessary.

742. Particular responsibility for local Scottish affairs in specific areas of the United States will be allocated to each of the envisaged eight diplomatic missions.

743. **Scotland's US Consular Districts** of accreditation could be structured as follows.

Embassy of Scotland in the United States of America
US Consular Districts

DISTRICT	MISSION	ACCREDITATION
US-1	Consulate General Boston, MA	Connecticut · Maine · Massachusetts New Hampshire · Rhode Island · Vermont
US-2	Consulate General New York, NY	New Jersey · New York · Pennsylvania
US-3	Embassy Washington, DC	Delaware · District of Columbia · Maryland Virginia · West Virginia · All US Territories
US-4	Consulate General Chicago, IL	Illinois · Indiana · Iowa · Kansas Kentucky · Michigan · Minnesota · Missouri Nebraska · Ohio · Wisconsin
US-5	Consulate General Atlanta, GA	Alabama · Florida · Georgia · Mississippi North Carolina · South Carolina · Tennessee
US-6	Consulate General Houston, TX	Arkansas · Louisiana · Oklahoma · Texas
US-7	Consulate General Denver, CO	Arizona · Colorado · Montana · New Mexico North Dakota · South Dakota · Utah · Wyoming
US-8	Consulate General San Francisco, CA	Alaska · California · Hawaii · Idaho Nevada · Oregon · Washington

744. Each mission will normally provide consular services and other services only within its accreditation area. Other arrangements may be made in individual circumstances.

5F. Network Development

745. The creation of an entirely new diplomatic network of a newly sovereign state is for most a once-in-a-lifetime experience. It must be approached in a measured manner.

746. Building the Scottish Diplomatic Network will require investment, ingenuity and time.

747. It would not be sensible to attempt to open simultaneously 110 diplomatic missions at the point of independence, or even open them in the immediate period afterwards.

748. Instead, missions should be opened in a phased manner over a period of time.

749. The Department should plan the building of the diplomatic footprint on the basis of **Diplomatic Network Development Stages**. This approach should feature four stages of six months each, collectively beginning at the point of independence.

750. Scotland's Diplomatic Network Development Stages could be structured as follows.

Department of European and External Relations
Diplomatic Network Development Stages

NO	MONTHS	EMBASSIES AND REPRESENTATION	CONSULATES GENERAL	MULTILATERAL MISSIONS	TOTALS
1	0 – 6	Beijing · Berlin · Brussels · Dublin The Hague · Islamabad · London Madrid · Mexico City · Moscow New Delhi · Oslo · Ottawa · Paris Pretoria · Prague · Rome · Seoul Tokyo · Vienna · Warsaw Washington DC	Boston · Chicago Manchester · New York San Francisco	EU UN New York NATO	22 EMB 5 CG 3 MULT **30 TOTAL**
2	6 – 12	Abuja · Addis Ababa · Athens Bangkok · Bern · Brasilia Bratislava · Bucharest Buenos Aires · Budapest Canberra · Copenhagen Helsinki · Lisbon · Ljubljana Luxembourg · Nairobi · Nicosia Riga · Riyadh · Sophia · Stockholm Tallinn · Valletta · Vilnius · Zagreb	Amsterdam · Atlanta Barcelona · Denver Houston · Marseille Montréal · Milan Munich · Newcastle Toronto	UN/IO Geneva UN/IO Vienna COE OSCE	26 EMB 11 CG 4 MULT **41 TOTAL**
3	12– 18	Accra · Amman · Ankara · Bogota Cairo · Dakar · Jakarta · Kingston Kuala Lumpur · Manila · Santiago Wellington	Bilbao · Frankfurt Hong Kong · Mumbai São Paulo · Shanghai Sydney · Vancouver	OECD-UNESCO	12 EMB 8 CG 1 MULT **21 TOTAL**
4	18 – 24	Abu Dhabi · Algiers · Dar es Salaam Hanoi · Kiev · Kigali · Lilongwe Lusaka · Rabat · Ramallah Reykjavik · Singapore · Tel Aviv	Belfast · Cardiff Istanbul · Nuuk Tórshavn		12 EMB 1 REP 5 CG **18 TOTAL**

751. With this framework, the headline objective will be to open all envisaged missions of the Scottish Diplomatic Network within 24 months from the point of independence.

752. Such an approach is ambitious but feasible. To succeed, extensive preparation in the Transition Phase will be necessary, especially for Stage 1 Missions.

753. The Scotland-UK Framework Agreement should facilitate such preparation.

754. Prospective missions are categorised in the four stages based on prioritisation. Major EU and global capitals are included in Stage 1. All EU capitals are either in Stage 1 or Stage 2. Multilateral missions will differ in form in the pre-membership phases.

755. It will be imperative to learn from each stage for the next, notably from Stage 1 to the subsequent stages. This framework is an indicative guide, not a fixed timetable.

756. Progress should be assessed at regular intervals and adjustments made as needed, including moving missions between stages or lengthening the duration of a stage.

757. Rigorous oversight over the construction of the Scottish Diplomatic Network will be provided by the Parliament, Special Scrutiny Committee and other relevant bodies.

758. The timely establishment of Scotland's initial diplomatic missions will be essential to its effective representation in the state's formative period – and it must be a priority.

6. Bilateral Relations

759. As sovereign state, Scotland will conduct bilateral diplomatic relations with the other states of the world. Its closest relationships with always be with its fellow EU Member States, including France, Germany and Ireland. Scotland will also develop a strategic bilateral relationship with the United States. It will frame its relationship with China through the EU and establish constructive relations with the United Kingdom. It will forge new relationships with other states, including Canada, Norway and Japan.

760. This Chapter assess the form of **Scotland and Bilateral Relationships**, including with the **EU Member States**, the **United States of America**, **People's Republic of China**, the **United Kingdom of England and Wales and Northern Ireland** and **Other States**.

6A. Scotland and Bilateral Relationships

761. Bilateral relationships, taken here as formal relations between two states, constitute an integral part of modern international relations.

762. The development of the United Nations, multilateral organisations, the wider global system, and of course the European Union, has given the impression to many that the maintenance of traditional bilateral relations holds less importance.

763. However, that assessment is incorrect. Bilateral relationships remain significant and worthy of substantial investment and attention.

764. Particularly as a new state in the world, the Republic must actively pursue its bilateral connections with partners in Europe and the globe.

765. Fulfilling the Principles for European and External Relations will require Scotland to cooperate with other states, on the basis of common ground and shared values.

766. At the same time, the Republic must be consistent and forthright in articulating those differences with other states on matters of values which may arise.

767. While Scotland benefits from long-standing relationships with many states already, such relations have inevitably been shaped and limited by its constitutional status.

768. Bilateral relations between states are of a completely different order. The change of statehood will require Scotland to actively transform its relationships to a new level.

769. In response, the Republic will create structures and make investments, notably the Scottish Diplomatic Network, and take other measures as outlined in the Blueprint.

770. Scotland should prepare for its new relations, to the extent possible, in the Transition Phase. The Scotland-UK Framework Agreement should facilitate such preparation.

771. As a European small state, Scotland will have relatively limited resources, compared to the number of states in the world, and it must prioritise its bilateral relations.

772. Such prioritisation will be required during the Transition and Foundation Phases, and in general. Across the current 193 UN Member States, Scotland must be strategic.

773. Given the constitutional nature of the EU, a perceivable distinction will exist between Scotland's bilateral relations with fellow EU members and those with non-EU states.

774. In the Department, relations with individual states will be managed by the respective Area Directorate, through the Country Coordinators and Regional Coordinators.

775. The Political Director will provide political and strategic support where needed.

776. Plans and strategies for particular states and wider regions will be developed, which will complement Scotland's diplomatic strategy.

777. For states outwith the European Union, the Republic should have regard to EU foreign policy in determining its own approach to those states.

778. The primary focus of bilateral relationships for the Government will be corresponding state governments. Nevertheless, it will also engage with sub-state governments.

779. In such engagement, the Government must note the constitutional arrangements of the territories in question and respect the sovereignty of the associated state.

780. While bilateral relations are often visualised through the government-to-government frame, it is important to appreciate the range of actors involved in practice. Business, civil society and individuals all have roles in sustaining links between states.[53]

781. Although the Government will take forward its engagement and coordinate some of the wider activity, it should appreciate that oftentimes the best course of action will be to refrain from interfering in natural non-governmental bilateral connections.

782. It is not feasible to review in detail in the Blueprint all the states with which Scotland will have bilateral relations. Some of the most relevant are considered as follows.

6B. EU Member States

783. Scotland's closest bilateral relations will always be with its fellow EU Member States.

784. All EU members have voluntarily committed to progressively integrating themselves through the Union, to make common cause for mutual benefit and to promote values.

785. Through the Union institutions and from deep shared political, economic and social heritage, the Republic's bilateral relations with other EU members will be profound.

786. In the Foundation Phase, Scotland will intensify and develop its existing relationships with EU states throughout the pre-accession period and after joining the Union.

787. As outlined earlier in the Blueprint, the Republic will maintain an Embassy in every current and future EU Member State, exemplifying its commitment to each.

788. Relationships with EU members will cover bilateral matters concerning that state and Scotland, and wider EU matters of general and specific interest.

789. To become successful in the EU, Scotland must build effective bilateral triangulation between Edinburgh, Brussels and EU capitals.

790. It must forge alliances and partnerships based on common ground, as set out earlier in the Blueprint and in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*.[54]

791. In the Department, the Directorate for Europe will have a pivotal role in coordinating the Government's engagement across all three domains of bilateral triangulation.

792. The Chief Counsellor of State and Depute Chief Counsellor of State will take particular interest in and responsibility for European relations in all their dimensions.

793. While productive bilateral relations with every EU member will be valued by Scotland, in practice, relations with certain Member States will occupy more of its time.

794. These prioritisations will derive from the political realities of the Union, the Republic's priorities for its role in the EU and connections between Scotland and specific states.

795. Parameters for Scotland's relations with particular EU Member States are as follows.

France

796. France and Scotland share a rich history and a centuries-long *Auld Alliance*. Across bilateral, EU and global affairs, France will be an indispensable partner for Scotland.

797. Scotland should aim to develop a comprehensive bilateral relationship with France, covering political, economic and social domains. DEER can highlight its use of French.

798. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain an Embassy in Paris and a Consulate General in Marseille. It will invest notably in this Embassy.

799. The Two Republics should seek to work together on various matters in the European Union and at the United Nations, organisations where France is a leading member.

800. France's support for strengthening the Union demonstrates the salience of Scotland evaluating its approach to EMU and political integration in light of its surroundings.

801. Both states could establish a **Franco-Scottish Council** to further mutual connections.

Germany

802. Germany and Scotland have deep connections of history, economics and culture. Bilaterally and in the EU, Germany will also be an indispensable partner for Scotland.

803. Scotland should look to build a comprehensive bilateral relationship with Germany, across political, economic and social domains, including education and research.

804. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain an Embassy in Berlin and Consulates General in Munich and Frankfurt. It will invest notably in this Embassy.

805. Both sides should aim to cooperate in the EU on matters ranging from deepening the Digital Single Market to ensuring European investment in research and development.

806. Scotland and Germany could establish an economic and social dialogue, including on the social market economy, innovation, technology, energy and climate change.

807. The two states could work to intensify higher education partnerships and exchanges. Scotland could also increase its engagement with particular German federal states.

Larger Member States – Italy · Spain · Poland

808. Scotland will invest in its bilateral relationships with the other Larger Member States: Italy, Spain and Poland. While quite different, each will be important to Scotland.

809. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain Embassies in Rome, Madrid and Warsaw and Consulates General in Milan, Barcelona and Bilbao.

810. Italy and Scotland should develop closer relations generally, such as on research and innovation, and make common cause on improving the sustainability of the EU.

811. Spain and Scotland should establish constructive partnerships on a range of shared interests in joint, European and global affairs, such as energy and climate change.

812. Poland and Scotland should work together on the basis of European values, drawing on their community linkages and cooperating on defence and security through NATO.

Nordic Member States – Sweden · Finland · Denmark

813. The Nordic EU states – Sweden, Finland and Denmark – will all be important partners for Scotland, individually and collectively. The four will share much common ground.

814. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain Embassies in Stockholm, Helsinki and Copenhagen. It will also engage with the Nordic Council.

815. Scotland and the Nordic EU states should establish bilateral and common relations, through creating new structures and adding Scotland to existing structures.

816. Together with the non-EU members of the Nordic Council, the four states should take forward the concept of a Nordic-Scotland Strategic Partnership.

817. The four should work together in the EU on matters of common interest. Scotland will respect Nordic EU cooperation that those three may want to retain without Scotland.

818. The four should also work together in international organisations, including the UN, on areas such as democracy, human rights and multilateralism.

Ireland

819. In many respects, Ireland will be Scotland's closest bilateral partner. The two states share common perspectives and profound connections as neighbour island nations.

820. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain an Embassy in Dublin. Both states will also collaborate through Common Islands institutions.

821. The two sides could decide to develop an **Ireland-Scotland Strategic Partnership** to facilitate the full range of bilateral diplomatic relations and wider cooperation.

822. Ireland and Scotland will have many points of agreement on EU affairs and chances to advocate joint positions. Scotland will respect Ireland's distinct identity in the EU.

823. The two should build bilateral synergies in international organisations, including the United Nations, on themes such as human rights, climate change and a just transition.

824. Other institutions, such as the Houses of the Oireachtas and Parliament of Scotland, could also resolve to enhance their own direct cooperation.

6C. United States of America

825. The United States of America will be a strategic bilateral partner for Scotland and the most significant state for Scotland's engagement outside the European Union.[55]

826. Scotland and the United States have extensive connections dating to the founding of the US. With Scotland now a state, they will develop their partnership to a new level.

827. Their bilateral relationship will be essential to Scotland as it defines its European and global role. Support from the US for Scotland as it endeavours to join the UN, NATO and a large number of other multilateral organisations will be invaluable.

828. Most EU Member States operate a duality in their relations with the US – basing them partly on a *united* front from the EU, partly on a *special* bond with the US.

829. Scotland should aim for a wide-ranging and broad-based relationship with the United States, incorporating political, economic and social matters of common interest.

830. The Republic should make investments in the relationship matching those ambitions, including in its diplomatic footprint in the United States.

831. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain an Embassy in Washington, DC and Consulates General in Boston, New York, Chicago, Atlanta, Houston, Denver and San Francisco.

832. This diplomatic footprint will be Scotland's largest in any single state. It will provide comprehensive representation across the contiguous United States.

833. This Embassy will be one of the largest and most significant missions for Scotland.

834. In the Department, the Directorate for Americas will manage bilateral relations with the United States. Other Directorates will be involved in relation to their remits.

835. The Chief Counsellor of State and Depute Chief Counsellor of State will take particular interest in and responsibility for transatlantic relations in all their dimensions.

836. The Parliament may decide to appoint from its membership a **Special Delegate from the Parliament of Scotland to the US Congress** to further legislative relations.

837. In their diplomatic relations, Scotland and the United States will have various frames in which they will engage – notably at the UN, in NATO and through EU-US relations.

838. Scotland should build political relationships that transcend bilateral differences and ensure continued positive cooperation between both states.

839. The Government should regularly interact with political actors on a bipartisan basis, with the resolute intention that Scotland is a matter of bipartisanship in Washington.

840. Political relations can be advanced through venues including the Friends of Scotland Caucus in the US Congress. Government Ministers should frequently visit the US.[56]

841. The two states should expand on their existing economic connections and enhance bilateral trade. The United States will be a cornerstone export market for Scotland.

842. The Republic will also surely have the aspiration that business investment in Scotland from the US private sector increases, not least in that Scotland will be an EU member.

843. American institutions and individuals, both with Scottish connections and otherwise, could also be significantly interested in Scottish government bonds and instruments.

844. Given the implications of creating the Scottish state and its nascent position, it is not inconceivable that the US might offer financial or other assistance to Scotland.

845. The Government and the Parliament will have to determine their positions in those respects. They should reflect the Scotland-US friendship and the needs of the state.

846. Education and research are promising domains of bilateral cooperation. Both states can build on their extensive existing links and interest in each other's institutions.

847. A foundational aspect of the relationship will be the Republic's engagement with the Scottish diaspora in the US, broadly defined to include ancestry, interest and affinity.

848. Scotland should exponentially increase its connectivity with Scottish Americans and all those with an interest in the state, cooperating with numerous civil society actors.

849. The Government and non-governmental Scottish actors should develop an array of measures, including scholarships, fellowships, exchanges and wider partnerships.

850. Beyond federal institutions, Scotland should engage with state and local actors. The Glasgow-Pittsburgh partnership is a notable existing example of such cooperation.[57]

851. All of these strands of engagement should be cultivated, implemented and supported by Scotland's Embassy in Washington and Consulates General across the US.

852. A strategic approach of intelligent investment and long-term partnerships will ensure that Scotland builds effective and beneficial bilateral relations with the United States.

6D. People's Republic of China

853. The People's Republic of China will be a consequential state in Scotland's external affairs and one with which it should establish a constructive bilateral relationship.

854. Scotland and China will each be actively engaged in the world in their different ways. China is also undisputedly the most significant rising global power.

855. Scotland will conduct a values-based foreign policy, in accord with the foundational values of the Republic and the Principles for European and External Relations.

856. As with all states, Scotland will express its views and values in its bilateral relations with China, including its support for human rights and the rules-based global system.

857. While it is evident that the two states will have different perspectives on a number of matters, Scotland should seek cordial relations with China wherever possible.

858. In many respects, Scotland should frame its bilateral relationship with China through the European Union. The EU, US and China are actors of systemic global influence.

859. The EU and China have the influence to shape international institutions and rules. The collective power of the EU is one of its many benefits for smaller states like Scotland.

860. Accordingly, Scotland will often find greater success in influencing China through its efforts to shape the EU's foreign policy, rather than its direct engagement with China.

861. As noted earlier in the Blueprint, European debate is intensifying on the development of a more coherent EU foreign policy, including in respect of relations with China.

862. Scotland should support the building of a cogent EU foreign policy, with institutional and policy innovation. It will make clear to all actors its commitment to a united EU.

863. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain an Embassy in Beijing and Consulates General in Shanghai and Hong Kong.

864. This diplomatic footprint may be expanded in the future, beyond the initial period of the Foundation Phase, as the Government assesses its diplomatic investments.

865. In the Department, the Directorate for Asia and Pacific will manage bilateral relations with China. Other Directorates will be involved in relation to their remits.

866. The Chief Counsellor of State and Depute Chief Counsellor of State will take particular interest in and responsibility for relations with China.

867. Scotland will share common priorities of the European Union for relations with China, including those on human rights, standards, intellectual property and investment.

868. More specifically, Scotland and China could develop their relations in areas such as higher education, where the two states have existing connections.

869. Both Scotland and China will also be engaged in common areas of interest, including climate change and the global transition to low-carbon and zero-carbon economies.

870. In shaping its engagement principally through the European Union, Scotland will be well positioned to build a productive bilateral relationship with China.

6E. United Kingdom (EWNI)

871. The United Kingdom of England and Wales and Northern Ireland will evidently be the geographically closest state to Scotland and an important bilateral partner.

872. Scotland and the United Kingdom will maintain deep economic and social links after the point of independence of Scotland. They will share many aspects of past history.

873. The two states must work cooperatively in the management of their common island, particularly in respect of the environment, transport and flows of people and goods.

874. Many of the modalities for the independence of Scotland on EU and foreign policy are assessed in the Blueprint. All other relevant domains will also require assessment.

875. In certain dimensions, especially in the Foundation Phase, bilateral relations with the UK will be highly consequential for Scotland. Such intensity will lessen over time.

876. The Republic should resolve to be a positive and constructive neighbour to the United Kingdom, indicative of its mature and responsible approach to external relations.

877. It should maintain this approach, regardless of the attitudes of the United Kingdom.

878. The two states will have political, institutional and strategic differences. Scotland will be a member of the European Union and the United Kingdom will not.

879. In that regard, Scotland will be a wholehearted advocate of European integration and the values of the European Union. No party will be in doubt as to Scotland's affiliation.

880. Scotland will support close and dynamic EU-UK relations, based on the fundamental principles of respecting obligations and honouring commitments.

881. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain an Embassy in London and Consulates General in Manchester, Newcastle, Cardiff and Belfast.

882. This Embassy will be a large and significant mission for Scotland.

883. This diplomatic footprint will provide suitable representation for Scotland in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, on local affairs and the wider bilateral relationship.

884. In the Department, the Directorate for Europe will manage bilateral relations with the United Kingdom. Other Directorates will be involved in relation to their remits.

885. The Counsellor of State for Common Islands Relations will provide strategic support on all dimensions of bilateral and trilateral relationships with the UK and the region.

886. Personal connections between the Republic and the UK will be numerous. Hundreds of thousands of citizens of each state could live in the other's territory.

887. Citizenship and legacy issues should be addressed in the treaty of separation.

888. New structures will be required to create a **Shared Island Architecture**, on the basis of cooperation between sovereign states. Scotland will not share UK institutions.

889. The Common Islands Council, described earlier in the Blueprint, could be a principal forum for bilateral and trilateral cooperation. All parties should invest in its success.

890. A **Scotland-United Kingdom Council** (SUKC) could be instituted to facilitate bilateral cooperation between the two states. Further mechanisms should be developed.

891. The **Bilateral Relations Agenda** between Scotland and the UK should incorporate economic and social relations, defence and security matters and shared global goals.

892. The two should aim to work collaboratively in international organisations, such as the UN and NATO. Multilateralism is essential to the prosperity of both states.

893. Scotland should promote the evolution of sustainable and productive relations with the United Kingdom, through the Foundation Phase and beyond.

894. Full analysis of the structure of bilateral relations between the Republic of Scotland and the United Kingdom should be undertaken separately.

6F. Other States

895. Scotland will maintain diplomatic relations with the other UN Member States. It will invest differently in each bilateral relationship, in line with its diplomatic strategy.

896. A selection of other states with certain relevance to Scotland is as follows.

Canada

897. Canada should be a close bilateral partner for Scotland. The two have many elements of common history and shared values at home and in the world.

898. Scotland should seek to develop a strategic partnership with Canada, including direct bilateral cooperation at all levels and joint work at the UN and in NATO.

899. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain an Embassy in Ottawa and Consulates General in Montréal, Toronto and Vancouver.

900. In the design of its own institutions, Scotland should learn from Global Affairs Canada and Canada's global engagement approach, including its contributions to the UN.

901. Scotland should support EU-Canada relations, including with CETA and the Strategic Partnership Agreement. A close Scotland-Canada bond could be valuable to the EU.

Norway

902. Norway will surely be Scotland's close non-EU European bilateral partner. The two states share deep cultural roots, economic links, geography and modern interests.

903. Both sides should aim to progressively build their bilateral relationship, including on higher education and research, defence and security, and universal values.

904. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain an Embassy in Oslo.

905. While they will notably not have the commonality of EU membership, Scotland and Norway will be a position to work together at the UN, in NATO and other institutions.

906. Scotland should seek to learn from Norway's expertise in international relations and major global issues. It should consider what expertise it might share in return.

Russia

907. Russia will be a strategic neighbour for Scotland, a global actor in its relative vicinity. While the two have historical links, they will also have markedly different worldviews.

908. Scotland will be a member of the EU and NATO. The bilateral relations of each with Russia have only continued to deteriorate in recent years, with no signs of change.

909. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain an Embassy in Moscow.

910. Scotland and Russia will both be engaged in common areas of interest, including the North and Norwegian Seas, the High North and the Arctic.

911. As with all states, Scotland will express its views and values in its bilateral relations with Russia, including its support for human rights and the international system.

Japan

912. Japan should be a bilateral partner of focus for Scotland, as a global actor in Asia with which Scotland will share many positions, such as the value of international law.

913. Scotland should resolve to deepen its bilateral relationship with Japan, including on research and development, innovation, energy and climate change.

914. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain an Embassy in Tokyo.

915. The two states should look to collaborate on areas of excellence and work together to promote the rules-based global system in Asia, Europe and worldwide.

916. Scotland should support the continued intensification of EU-Japan relations, through the Economic Partnership Agreement, Strategic Partnership Agreement and beyond.

Switzerland

917. Switzerland should be an important non-EU European partner for Scotland, a globally oriented state at the centre of diplomacy and international relations in practice.

918. Scotland and Switzerland should build a bilateral relationship covering a wide range of themes on political, economic and social affairs, including research and education.

919. In the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will maintain an Embassy in Bern.

920. The two states should often find common ground on global issues, not least within the many international organisations and agencies which Switzerland hosts.

921. Scotland should underline its support for modernising EU-Swiss relations through the conclusion and full implementation of the Institutional Agreement.

7. Systems and Agencies

922. To fulfil its responsibilities, the Department of European and External Relations will need the appropriate systems. Personnel at headquarters and in missions around the world will depend on these foundations. It will also develop the structures to provide consular services to Scottish citizens and others. The Department will operate three specialised agencies to undertake its work in relation to international development, trade and investment, and passports and documentation.

923. This Chapter reviews DEER's **Systems Infrastructure**, Scotland's **State Documents of Identification**, its **Consular Operations**, the **Scottish Global Cooperation Agency**, the **Scottish Trade Council** and the **Passport Authority of Scotland**.

7A. Systems Infrastructure

924. The functioning of the Department of European and External Relations, including the Scottish Diplomatic Network, will depend upon robust and reliable systems.

925. The Directorate for Operations will have primary responsibility for these systems.

926. In support of this work, the Directorate and the wider Department will interact with other Government Departments, agencies and institutions as appropriate.

927. Preparation of such systems infrastructure should begin at the earliest stage during the Transition Phase, given the high likelihood that Scotland will start from a position of significant dependence on the infrastructure of the United Kingdom state.

928. Three systems are notably relevant: communications, security and online presence.

929. A communications system appropriate to the conduct of diplomacy will be required.

930. This system must provide secure, reliable and rapid communications traffic between Scottish diplomatic missions and the Department, and between diplomatic staff.

931. In the modern age, the vast majority of communications take place in a digital form. Certain sensitive documentation may still be moved manually by diplomatic courier.

932. It will be essential to ensure that the communication system is sufficiently insulated from potential threats from state and non-state actors.

933. The Directorate should have regard to related open-source software as appropriate. It should liaise with EU and trusted international government actors for advice.

934. A security system will be necessary to provide for the safety and security of particular persons in the course of the operations of the Department.

935. Adequate security arrangements will be required for the Department headquarters, all Scottish diplomatic missions, relevant diplomatic residences and other facilities.

936. Security measures will also be needed for diplomatic missions hosted in Scotland, relevant diplomatic personnel posted in Scotland and visiting dignitaries.

937. In response, a diplomatic protection service function will be created, either as part of the police service, an independent organisation or part of another organisation, as a national gendarmerie.

938. The Directorate will coordinate with counterparts in the Department of Justice, the Department of Defence and the security and intelligence agencies of the state.

939. An online presence for the Department will be foundational to its public engagement.

940. This presence must offer reliable, secure and timely digital material and services to the public. It should be part of the general digital infrastructure of the Government.

941. A signal unified online presence for the Department should be established through a common location, such as **global.gov.scot**, which is easy to find and share.

942. The Directorate should implement principles of e-government to the extent possible, not least given that the Department, through PAS, will be responsible for passports.

943. Sufficient consideration should be given to new capabilities, increases in demand and future evolution for the Department's online presence.

7B. State Documents of Identification

944. The Government, through the Passport Authority of Scotland, will issue documents proving identity and citizenship that will be titled **State Documents of Identification**.

945. The primary SDIs produced by the Authority will be passports.

946. Passports are a manifestation of the state and its citizenship. Scottish passports will symbolise the Republic, its values and citizenship of Scotland.

947. The Government should have close regard to European and international standards for passports and government documents of identification which must be satisfied.

948. The **Scottish Standard Passport** will be available to every citizen of Scotland.

949. The qualifications for citizenship are considerations of the utmost seriousness. Such matters have an extraordinary impact on people's lives.

950. Due care must be taken in the establishment of the criteria for Scottish citizenship.

951. Full analysis of citizenship and its evolution during the transition to an independent Scottish state should be undertaken separately.

952. The Scottish Standard Passport front cover could be designed as follows.

953. The Standard Passport design has five principal features:

- The reference to the European Union in a secondary position
  European Union | Aonadh Eòrpach
- The formal name of the state in a primary position
  Republic of Scotland | Poblachd na h-Alba
- The emblem of the state in a primary position
- The name of the document in a secondary position
  Passport | Cead-siubhail
- The international biometric passport symbol in a secondary position

954. The Standard Passport will be styled in English and Gaelic, as State Languages. The emblem of the state will be designed during the Transition Phase. The cover should be set in a European burgundy.

955. The reference to the European Union will be omitted from the passport design until Scotland become an EU Member State.

956. The **Scottish Diplomatic Passport** will be available to representatives of the state.

957. The Diplomatic Passport will entitle the bearer to diplomatic status and respective privileges under international law and general custom.

958. The scope of entitlement to a Diplomatic Passport must be defined. SEERS personnel posted outwith Scotland will always be issued with such documentation and required to use it for official travel, business and residence.

959. It is possible that other state representatives, including Government Ministers and Members of the Parliament, could be entitled to a Diplomatic Passport for the specific period of service in their roles and in the context of their official duties.

960. The Scottish Diplomatic Passport front cover could be designed as follows.





961. The Diplomatic Passport design has five principal features:

- The reference to the European Union in a secondary position
  European Union | Aonadh Eòrpach | Union européenne
- The formal name of the state in a primary position
  Republic of Scotland | Poblachd na h-Alba | République d'Écosse
- The emblem of the state in a primary position
- The name of the document in a secondary position
  Diplomatic Passport | Cead-siubhail Dioplomasach | Passeport diplomatique
- The international biometric passport symbol in a secondary position

962. The Diplomatic Passport will be styled in English and Gaelic, as State Languages, and French, as the traditional language of diplomacy. The emblem of the state will be the same used for the Standard Passport.

963. The cover colour of diplomatic passports varies across the EU Member States. Some use the same European burgundy as for their standard passports, while other use a distinct colour which is often reflective of national symbols.[58]

964. The cover of the Scottish Diplomatic Passport should be set in a thistle purple.

965. Reference to the European Union also varies across the EU members, with only some including it on their diplomatic passports. The Scottish Diplomatic Passport will have this reference, but it will be omitted until Scotland become an EU Member State.

966. The Department must define robust protocols on the issuance, use and cancellation of Diplomatic Passports, to ensure good governance and maintain public confidence.

967. The interior of Scottish passports should incorporate introductory texts in all Official Languages of the European Union. All details will be in English, Gaelic and French.

968. Their interior design should showcase the richness of Scottish and European culture and geography. It should include the principal symbols of the Republic.

969. The Government should give consideration to issuing a supplementary passport card.

970. The **Scottish Passport Card** would be available to every citizen of Scotland.

971. The Passport Card would serve as a general means of identification and be suitable for travel to and residence in the EU, EEA and Switzerland.

972. It would act as an alternative to the national identity cards issued by most European states. This approach would accord with Scotland's societal and legal tradition. The Scottish Passport Card would be analogous to the Irish Passport Card.[59]

973. In time, the Passport Card could become commonly used within Scotland.

974. Other State Documents of Identification may be established and issued.

7C. Consular Operations

975. The Department, through the Directorate for Consular Services, will undertake all the consular operations of the state.

976. It will offer **consular services** through the Directorate, Passport Authority of Scotland and Scottish diplomatic missions around the world. The design and functions of PAS are considered later in the Blueprint.

977. Such services will include the issuance and management of passports, visas, permits and authorisations, and the registration of vital life events outwith Scotland.

978. It will therefore provide certain services to citizens of Scotland and others to relevant non-citizens, including permanent residents, residents and visitors.

979. The Department will offer **consular assistance** through the Directorate and Scottish diplomatic missions around the world.

980. Such assistance will relate to eventualities outwith Scotland and may include support in cases of arrest and process, and repatriation from human and natural disasters.

981. This assistance will habitually be provided to citizens of Scotland and the EU and their relations. DEER will also participate in assistance operations organised by the EU.

982. Under EU law, Member States will provide support through their diplomatic missions to citizens of other EU states where those citizens are unrepresented by their state.[60]

983. Given that, in the proposed Diplomatic Network, Scotland will not have an embassy in 121 UN Member States (all outwith the EU), such mutual support will be invaluable. It will have notable relevance for Scotland in Central America, Africa and Central Asia.

984. Scotland will also provide consular protection to EU citizens where asked, especially from citizens of smaller Member States with less extensive diplomatic networks.

985. While the Directorate will always endeavour to support citizens in need outwith the state or the EU in the appropriate way, they must also note the limits of such support.

986. Scottish citizens must be fully cognizant of these realities before leaving the state.

987. Citizens are responsible for following the laws of other states when in their territory, even where such laws do not accord with Scotland's values.

988. The Republic must respect the sovereignty of other states and not unduly engage in their internal affairs, as it would expect and require in return.

989. Accordingly, natural limits will arise on the actions and support which the Directorate can provide to citizens in need outwith the state.

990. It will also have regard to the cost implications of rendering sustained assistance in certain circumstances, in view of its responsibilities to the wider public.

991. The Directorate must develop appropriate systems and procedures for the effective provision of consular services and consular assistance.

992. Its operations should be founded on principles of respect, understanding, timeliness, fairness and proportionality. It may institute a **Scottish Consular Services Charter**.

993. The Department's Operations Centre will have a principal coordinating function in the management of situations and crises.

994. Some states engage private enterprise to undertake certain consular functions. It is envisaged that Scotland will not take such an approach.

7D. Scottish Global Cooperation Agency

995. The Parliament will establish by legislation a Departmental Agency, attached to the Department of European and External Relations, for international development.

996. The agency will be titled the **Scottish Global Cooperation Agency**.

997. The GCA will be managed in the Department by the Director for Global Cooperation.

998. It will be styled principally in English, as: **Scottish Global Cooperation Agency |** *Partnership from the People of Scotland* **[Government of Scotland | Riaghaltas na h-Alba]**.

999. The prototype wordmark of the Agency is as follows.

> **Scottish Global Cooperation Agency**
> Partnership from the People of Scotland
>
> GOVERNMENT OF SCOTLAND
> RIAGHALTAS NA H-ALBA

1000. The GCA will implement the Government's international development and assistance policies, principally through the management and funding of relevant programmes.

1001. The Agency may also undertake supplementary cooperation in the spirit of peace and friendship, focused on culture and exchange, with all parts of the world.

1002. It will be imperative that the design and structure of the GCA are rooted in values of cooperation and partnership, consistent with the Principles for External Relations.

1003. In the design of the GCA and its programmes, the Government should have regard to the agencies and programmes of comparable European states and other states.

1004. The Government should maximise the potential of the Scotland Consultation Group for insight and suggestions from leaders and officials.

1005. It should also engage as appropriate with the substantial presence of development and cooperation organisations situated in Scotland.

1006. Expertise from the current Scottish Government's international development work should be transferred, and also that from the former UK DfID offices in East Kilbride.

1007. The **Advisory Council of the Scottish Global Cooperation Agency** should be created to provide advice and expertise on matters related to the operations of the Agency.

1008. The GCA will cooperate with different states and territories. It is possible that it will continue and develop partnerships with the partner countries of the current Scottish Government: Malawi, Pakistan, Rwanda and Zambia.[61]

1009. The GCA will also develop partnerships with other states. It should consider all new partnerships with full appreciation of the views and aspirations of potential partners.

1010. Government funding for international assistance and development is often quantified under the measurement of Official Development Assistance (ODA).[62]

1011. In that regard, ODA is not directly equivalent to the allocated budgetary expenditure for international assistance and development, but all cumulative support that meets the definitional criteria for classification as ODA.

1012. The target has long been established that donor states should have a ratio of ODA to their Gross National Income (GNI) of 0.7% per annum.[63]

1013. In considering its approach to ODA, the Republic should have regard to policies and practice of comparable European states.

1014. As noted earlier in the Blueprint, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Norway are pertinent European states of reference for Scotland.

1015. The ODA figures for these European states for two recent years are as follows.[64]

European States
Official Development Assistance (Net)

STATE	2017		2019	
	FLOWS (MIL)	PERCENT OF GNI	GRANT EQUI (MIL)	PERCENT OF GNI
Norway	$4,436.53	0.9927%	$4,677.61	1.0261%
Denmark	$2,581.56	0.7374%	$2,661.47	0.7169%
Scotland	***[$1,508.62]***	***0.7000%***	—	—
Finland	$1,158.97	0.4245%	$1,167.86	0.4169%
Ireland	$884.15	0.3174%	$1,016.62	0.3157%

Source | OECD (for European States) · Scottish Government (for Scottish GNI)

1016. These figures are useful as general reference. The Scottish figure is hypothetical.

1017. While not regularly assessed, Scotland's GNI was experimentally calculated in 2017.

1018. For that year, and with this GNI experimental statistic, were Scotland to have met the ODA/GNI target, its ODA would have hypothetically been $1.51 billion.

1019. The ODA/GNI target is an important commitment to equity and solidarity in the world. Once it has suitable institutions and capacity, the Republic should attain this target.

1020. In the Foundation Phase, Scotland will be building its own state. As for most aspects of its external action, it should take a phased approach to the GCA and its spending.

1021. This approach will ensure the adequate functioning of the Department's operations and the sustainability of the programmes which Scotland will operate and support.

1022. Full analysis of international development institutions and policies of an independent Scottish state should be undertaken separately.

7E. Scottish Trade Council

1023. The Parliament will establish by legislation a Departmental Agency, attached to the Department of European and External Relations, for trade and investment.

1024. The agency will be titled the **Scottish Trade Council** (Comhairle Malairt na h-Alba).

1025. The STC will be managed in the Department by the Director for Trade.

1026. It will be styled in English and Gaelic, as: **Scottish Trade Council | Comhairle Malairt na h-Alba [Government of Scotland | Riaghaltas na h-Alba]**.

1027. The prototype wordmark of the Council is as follows.

> **Scottish Trade Council**
> **Comhairle Malairt na h-Alba**
>
> GOVERNMENT OF SCOTLAND
> RIAGHALTAS NA H-ALBA

1028. The STC will implement elements of the Government's trade and investment policies. It will conduct trade representation and promotion of the Scottish economy.

1029. The Council and the Directorate for Trade will cooperate closely with the Department of Economic Affairs and other Government Departments as relevant.

1030. In accordance with the Principles for European and External Relations, the STC will structure its operations on the basis of sustainable, ethical trade policy.

1031. In the design of the Council, the Government should have regard to the agencies and initiatives of comparable European states, other states and non-state territories.

1032. It should engage extensively with the business community, including representative industry and regional bodies, and civil society organisations, including trade unions.

1033. Of all the domains of external action, trade is arguably the field in which the current Scottish Government has the greatest experience. Expertise should be transferred to build the new trade institutions for the Scottish state.

1034. The STC is intended to function as the Government's integrated trade promotion and representation organisation, uniting all previous applicable structures and initiatives.

1035. Preparations for the necessary mergers should take place in the Transition Phase.

1036. The **Advisory Board of the Scottish Trade Council** should be established to provide advice and expertise on matters related to the operations of the Council.

1037. In line with the Integrated Model for European and External Relations, the STC will base its operations outwith the state inside Scottish diplomatic missions.

1038. This co-location approach will promote connectivity between posted staff from STC and the wider missions. It will also be sensible, given that the STC is part of DEER.

1039. The Government should give consideration to the timeline of the establishment of the Council, in view of the construction of the state and its existing responsibilities.

1040. It is possible that the STC could commence some or most operations in the Transition Phase. The Scotland-UK Framework Agreement should facilitate such steps.

1041. In the Transition and Foundation Phases, Scotland will undergo the transformations of becoming a state and subsequently joining the European Union.

1042. Fostering certainty and confidence in trade and investment linked to Scotland will be a paramount task for the Government in these periods.

1043. The STC will perform a vital role in informing economic actors in Scotland, the rest of Europe and the world of the changes connected to EU pre-accession and accession.

1044. It will manage trade and investment relationships, showcasing the strengths of the Scottish economy and the future opportunities of Scotland as an EU member.

1045. Full analysis of trade institutions and policies of an independent Scottish state should be undertaken separately.

7F. Passport Authority of Scotland

1046. The Parliament will establish by legislation a Departmental Agency, attached to the Department of European and External Relations, for state document services.

1047. The agency will be titled the **Passport Authority of Scotland** (Ùghdarras nan Ceadan-siubhail na h-Alba).

1048. PAS will be managed in the Department by the Director for Consular Services.

1049. It will be styled principally in English and Gaelic, as: **Passport Authority of Scotland | Ùghdarras nan Ceadan-siubhail na h-Alba [Department of European and External Relations | Ministère des Relations européennes et extérieures | Roinn Chùisean Eòrpach agus Taoibh A-muigh]**.

1050. The prototype wordmark of the Authority is as follows.

> **Passport Authority of Scotland**
> **Ùghdarras nan Ceadan-siubhail na h-Alba**
>
> DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS
> MINISTÈRE DES RELATIONS EUROPÉENNES ET EXTÉRIEURES
> ROINN CHÙISEAN EÒRPACH AGUS TAOIBH A-MUIGH

1051. PAS will issue and manage State Documents of Identification, including the Scottish Standard Passport, Scottish Diplomatic Passport and Scottish Passport Card.

1052. It will also issue and manage other relevant documents for citizens and non-citizens, including the Emergency Passport and Travel Document.

1053. The Department must ensure that PAS operates in an efficient and reliable manner.

1054. The provision of State Documents of Identification will be an important public service utilised by a large proportion of the population. It will be a measuring point for many citizens in their assessment of the competence of the Government and the state.

1055. The Authority should be founded on good communication, reasonable pricing, timely service and compassion. It may institute a **PAS Customer Service Charter**.

1056. Consideration should be given to a process of grants or fee exemptions for relevant individuals unable to afford the issuance costs of State Documents of Identification.

1057. PAS should make provision for regular and special periods of higher demand. Specific arrangements will govern SDIs and the transition to independence.

1058. The Authority should establish multiple offices across the state. **PAS Offices** could be located in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Inverness.

1059. It could also operate a **PAS Mobile Passport** facility, a touring service visiting remote and rural communities on a regular basis or by registrations of interest.

1060. The Authority will integrate its services with the online presence of the Department.

1061. State Documents of Identification and other documents and authorisations will also be issued by consular personnel in Scottish diplomatic missions around the world.

8. Domestic Diplomacy

1062. While Scotland's diplomatic engagement will be oriented towards the rest of Europe and the world, diplomacy will take place in Scotland as well. This *domestic diplomacy* will be a vital component of maintaining relations with states and organisations. From the embassies that states will establish in Edinburgh to visits by dignitaries, the work of diplomatic relations will become part of the fabric of Scottish society. As Scotland builds its European and global role, a Scottish diplomatic culture will begin to form.

1063. This Chapter evaluates the regulation of **Diplomatic Protocol**, **Diplomatic Missions**, the planning of **Dignitary Visits**, the opportunities connected to **Organisations and Agencies**, **Conferences and Summits** and the creation of a **Diplomatic Culture**.

8A. Diplomatic Protocol

1064. As an independent state, Scotland will be responsible for the regulation of diplomatic activity conducted by other states within its territory.

1065. The Republic will undertake such regulation in accordance with treaties to which it will accede, including the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and international custom.

1066. Within the Department, the Directorate for Protocol will have primary responsibility for the management of diplomatic relations by other states in Scotland.

1067. The Chief of Protocol will ensure the rigorous application of diplomatic protocol.

1068. Such application will extend to resident diplomatic missions, the entire Department of European and External Relations and other Government Departments as relevant.

1069. The Directorate may liaise on matters of protocol with the Parliament at its request.

1070. The Directorate will correspond with resident diplomatic missions and certain offices of multilateral organisations in Scotland through relevant notes and documentation.

1071. It will maintain a register of all diplomatic missions and personnel posted in Scotland.

1072. This register will be titled the **Edinburgh Diplomatic List**. It will be publicly available and updated regularly. The List will be used by public officials as required.

1073. Changes of missions and personnel will be notified to the Directorate, which will then amend the Diplomatic List.

1074. In accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Republic will institute a system of diplomatic privileges and immunities for personnel in Scotland.

1075. Under the system, qualifying persons will be immune from civil and criminal liability. Diplomatic duties will be exercised without interference from the state.

1076. Scottish diplomats posted outwith the Republic will enjoy corresponding privileges and immunities while resident in their host states.

1077. The Parliament will codify this system in Scots law by legislation, such as through a **Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act**.

1078. Should persons holding immunity contravene the laws of Scotland, they could not be subject to prosecution without the consent of the sending state.

1079. The Republic could expel such persons by declaring them *personae non gratae*.

1080. The Republic should extend privileges and immunities to qualifying representatives of the institutions of the European Union.

1081. It may extend them to qualifying representatives of some multilateral organisations.

8B. Diplomatic Missions

1082. Scotland will host diplomatic missions from states with which it maintains relations.

1083. The vast majority of these missions will be situated in the capital and its immediate surroundings. It is highly probable that Edinburgh will require a diplomatic quarter.

1084. Given that Scotland has not been an independent state for centuries, no such quarter currently exists in the city. It is not particularly evident where it could be located.

1085. It should ideally be fixed in relative proximity to the Principal Institutions of the State, particularly the Parliament of Scotland, the Department of the Prime Minister and the Department of European and External Relations.

1086. While individual states and organisations will obtain their own premises, and it is not for the Government to determine their offices or location, it will be reasonable for the Republic to give consideration to the general development of suitable facilities.

1087. The Government should engage with the City of Edinburgh Council in that direction.

1088. It should consider associated investment in the infrastructure of Edinburgh.

1089. Most states deciding to maintain a diplomatic presence in Scotland will exclusively operate an embassy in Edinburgh.

1090. While it is possible that states could operate consulates general, consulates or other missions in the Republic, it is envisaged that such scenarios will not be probable.

1091. Scotland will be a European small state and, in political and diplomatic assessments, would generally merit the placement of an embassy only.

1092. Glasgow is a notable city and might in other circumstances merit consulates general or consulates from states having close relations with Scotland. Yet, its geographical proximity to Edinburgh renders such prospects unlikely.

1093. Some may elect to open trade and investment offices in Glasgow. Many will also rely on Honorary Consulates located throughout Scotland.

1094. States which might open more than one diplomatic mission in Scotland could include: the United Kingdom, United States, France, Germany, Poland, Norway and Russia.

1095. At the same time, it is far from predestined that any state which maintains diplomatic relations with Scotland will operate a mission in the Republic.

1096. States will make political and diplomatic determinations, while taking account of the resources available for the diplomatic network. For various reasons, many states will not operate an embassy in Scotland.

1097. Similarly, as outlined earlier in the Blueprint, it is envisaged that Scotland will operate embassies in 72 of the current 193 Member States of the United Nations.

1098. It is possible that some states will dually accredit their embassy in London to include representation for Scotland – especially, but not exclusively, those which are smaller.

1099. The Government will decide whether it wishes to set out the various benefits to states from choosing to open embassies in Scotland.

1100. As a host state, the Republic will be responsible for ensuring the security of resident diplomatic missions in its territory. Certain missions will require greater security.

1101. The Directorate will coordinate with the Department of Justice, the police service and the security and intelligence agencies of the state.

1102. Beyond diplomatic missions, states may also operate other entities, such as cultural institutes, language organisations and trade bodies.

1103. Once Scotland becomes an EU member, the European Commission Office in Scotland and the European Parliament Liaison Office in Scotland will be opened. Offices of certain multilateral organisations may also be opened in Scotland.

8C. Dignitary Visits

1104. In the course of state, diplomatic and government duties, the Republic will receive dignitary representatives of states and organisations into Scotland.

1105. The Directorate for Protocol will have main responsibility for dignitary visits.

1106. Such visits will normally involve Heads of State, Heads of Government, government ministers, leaders of the European Union or heads of multilateral organisations.

1107. Dignitary visits will necessitate differing degrees of planning, ceremony, security and funding, depending on the individuals, the state or organisation and the visit reason.

1108. Each visit will have a particular purpose which the Directorate will work to fulfil.

1109. The Directorate will coordinate on dignitary visits with the Department of Justice, the police service and the security and intelligence agencies of the state as relevant.

1110. It will liaise with the Directorate for Consular Services on any visas required, although Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs should have visa-free access to Scotland for official business, regardless of normal requirements.

1111. State Visits, the most formal dignitary visit, will occur where the President invites the Head of State of another state to officially travel to Scotland.

1112. The President will host inward State Visits. The Directorate will support their planning on behalf of the Government and liaise with the Offices of the President.

1113. The Directorate will also support outward State Visits conducted by the President.

1114. Other forms of dignitary visits will have less formality and take place more frequently. In particular, ministers will make working visits to meet counterparts in Scotland.

1115. Such meetings will occur regularly in the context of EU affairs, including bilateral meetings with fellow EU members, multilateral formats and visits from EU leaders.

1116. When visiting Scotland, the President of the European Commission, President of the European Council and President of the European Parliament should be accorded the equivalent status of a visiting Head of State.

8D. Organisations and Agencies

1117. As a state, Scotland will be responsible for managing the presence of international organisations and agencies within its territory. Circumstances related to privileges, security and other considerations will be specific to the individual entity.

1118. Scotland currently hosts a small number of international organisations, including the British-Irish Council and the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization.[65]

1119. After the point of independence, it will be able to seek to host future organisations and agencies that will created by the EU, existing organisations and founding states.

1120. Hosting organisations and agencies can offer notable benefits, bringing prestige from the association, fostering ecosystems of related actors, supporting local economies through spending and creating opportunities for regular engagement by Government.

1121. When new organisations and agencies are created, formal application processes are often held to select the host state. Scotland would submit bids accordingly.

1122. Common assessment criteria for an application to host an organisation will include:

- Concentrations of relevant sectors and expertise
- Costs of business and operation in the host location
- Situation, features and amenities of prospective premises
- Supports offered by the Government, including lease guarantees
- Robust state institutions, legal system and governance
- Quality of life for personnel living in the host location
- Sufficient local talent for recruitment
- Transport connectivity to relevant destinations

1123. In advance of an application, Scotland should consult informally on the prospects for its success and gauge willingness to support its prospective bid, where appropriate.

1124. The EU aims to achieve balance in the distribution of agencies across all the Member States. Other institutions may not take such considerations into account.

1125. The Government should act strategically based on political and diplomatic dynamics. It should be mindful that hosting competitions often attract high interest from states.

8E. Conferences and Summits

1126. States, the European Union and international organisations hold regular conferences, summits, high-level meetings and dialogues across nearly every policy domain.

1127. As a member of the EU and major organisations, Scotland will have opportunities to organise and host both political and diplomatic conferences and summits.

1128. Of all aspects of domestic diplomacy, hosting international events is the field in which Scotland has the greatest experience, as the COP26 Glasgow conference will show.

1129. From its position as a state, Scotland will take on all conceivable responsibilities that arise with such gatherings, including diplomatic relations and national security.

1130. Over time, the Republic will host engagements in relation to the EU, especially during its presidencies of the EU Council, which will involve thousands of meetings.

1131. It will also host engagements in relation to multilateral organisations, including the United Nations and the wider UN System, especially during Scottish presidencies.

1132. Events could be held in Government Buildings, such as the Department of European and External Relations, or in State Buildings, such as the Palace of Holyroodhouse.

1133. Conferences and summits hosted in Scotland will create avenues for the Government to engage with European and global leaders and shape decision-making.

1134. These forums often involve co-hosts, presenting spaces to further bilateral relations. Wider Scotland, including civil society, can also often participate in side discussions.

1135. The Government should take all necessary steps to ensure that such events are well organised and support a positive European and international reputation for Scotland.

8F. Diplomatic Culture

1136. The establishment of the Scottish state will give rise to a new diplomatic culture, of a kind which has never before been part of modern Scotland.

1137. Together, the Government, the institutions of the state, several dozen embassies and other parts of society will create an ecosystem of political and diplomatic interaction.

1138. Government Ministers will regularly meet resident diplomats from across Europe and around the world. Diplomats will engage with think tanks, institutes and universities.

1139. The Department will facilitate bilateral and multilateral contacts with the diplomatic missions in Scotland on the various subject matters that will arise.

1140. It should fully include the resident European Commission and European Parliament Offices in its engagement and activities.

1141. This emergent environment will contribute substantially to the maturing of political and policy debate in Scotland, which will benefit the public.

1142. Scottish diplomatic culture will also be shaped by the evolution of the Department and SEERS, as they acquire institutional memory and organisational tradition.

1143. The Department will host an **Annual Diplomatic Conference**, potentially in August or September, around the traditional time of diplomatic rotation.

1144. The Conference will bring together the DEER senior leadership, Heads of Mission and others to discuss Scotland's diplomatic priorities and themes for the year ahead.

1145. It will often feature guest speakers from the rest of Europe and the world. In time, Scottish diplomacy will begin to develop its distinctive character.

9. Sectoral Interests

1146. Through a values-based foreign policy, Scotland will advocate its values and interests together. As reflected in the Principles for European and External Relations, Scotland must go further. It should conduct a holistic foreign policy that ensures the alignment between its internal and external action. To achieve meaningful progress on sectoral interests like multilateralism, migration, defence, trade and climate change, Scotland must work in harmony with itself at home, in the European Union and in the world.

1147. The Chapter surveys the building of a **Holistic Foreign Policy**, including in relation to **Multilateralism and Democracy**, **Migration and Population**, **Defence and Security**, **Trade and Investment** and **Climate Change and Environment**.

9A. Holistic Foreign Policy

1148. As a European small state, Scotland will find the greatest success in its European and external relations where it remains grounded in its values and interests together.

1149. The Government should pursue a **Holistic Foreign Policy** that unites the values of the Republic and its strategic national interests to produce benefits for the public.

1150. Across all different fields of European and external relations, values and interests will regularly coincide, once a longer-term perspective is adopted.

1151. A Holistic Foreign Policy recognises that the internal and external actions of the state are intrinsically connected and must be harmonious for either to be effective.

1152. This approach should be the foundation for the strategies of the Government.

1153. The Counsellors of State are intentionally designed to facilitate strategy, coordination and representation on major sectoral interests featuring in a Holistic Foreign Policy.

1154. Diplomacy is a business of communication, relationships and exchange. As societies change, so inherently does diplomacy as well. It reflects the global affairs of the time.

1155. While many of the formal structures of diplomacy were designed centuries ago, our era of multilateralism, technology and connectivity has created new fields of practice.

1156. The Government should develop a practice of **Intermodal Diplomacy** that combines traditional diplomacy with new forms, including public and digital diplomacy.

1157. It should use its Intermodal Diplomacy to advance a proactive Holistic Foreign Policy agenda, rather than simply respond to various global events as they materialise.

1158. Principal sectoral interests of Scotland's Holistic Foreign Policy are set out as follows.

9B. Multilateralism and Democracy

1159. Multilateralism and the rules-based global system will be of paramount importance to Scotland. Democracy will be the foundation of Scottish society and the Republic.

1160. As reflected in the Principles for European and External Relations, Scotland will work to sustain these core ideals within and outwith the state through a variety of means.

1161. Scotland will be a member of the European Union, an embodiment of highly advanced multilateralism, and fully committed to the principles and values of the Union.

1162. The Republic will be a wholehearted member of the United Nations, supportive both in words and action of its institutions, programmes and initiatives.

1163. Scotland will steadfastly uphold the rule of law, including international law, and work cooperatively on new international agreements furthering common objectives.

1164. It will advocate multilateralism, democracy and human rights in its bilateral relations and in its participation in the European Union and international organisations.

1165. The Constitution and the Principal Institutions of the State will all be instruments of Scottish democracy in their design and in their function.

1166. Scotland will work collaboratively on democracy and human rights in the Council of Europe and OSCE. It will be responsive to feedback given on Scottish institutions.

1167. The Counsellor of State for Multilateralism and the Counsellor of State for Democracy and Human Rights will provide high-level representation on their respective remits.

9C. Migration and Population

1168. Migration has become a notably salient issue within Europe in recent years, often in a negative way. Different forms of migration have been conflated in public debate.

1169. As a responsible state, Scotland will act with humanity, compassion and generosity in welcoming people to live who are vulnerable and in need of protection.

1170. The Republic will cooperate on related matters with its fellow EU Member States, the UNHCR and other relevant bodies. It should sign the Global Compact for Migration.

1171. Scotland will respond to arising international migration situations in accordance with its values and its commitments, as the primary concerns in those regards.

1172. At the same time, as a secondary concern, Scotland has a notable need for inward migration, in view of its particular population circumstances.[66]

1173. While return to the European Union will provide part of the solution, parts will reside outwith the Union. The Government must formulate its wider migration policy.

1174. In respect of qualifying third country nationals, it should consider processes offering expedited permanent residence and citizenship, including those from refugee routes.

1175. This sectoral domain is illustrative of the natural alignment in Holistic Foreign Policy. While Scotland will act first from its values, the same course also meets its interests.

9D. Defence and Security

1176. Defence and security, while often perceived in military and intelligence terms, in fact cover a wide range of threats, challenges and responses across all aspects of society.

1177. Traditional defence, provided by the Scottish Republic Defence Forces in cooperation with NATO allies, will cover Scotland's primary defence requirements.

1178. As a NATO member, Scotland will both receive defence and security benefits from the Alliance and make contributions to other allies, related to their needs.

1179. The extended geographical vicinity of Scotland, including the High North and Arctic, will combine defence and security, commerce and climate change considerations.

1180. The Depute Chief Counsellor and Counsellor of State for National Security will provide regular engagement and high-level representation on defence and security matters.

1181. The Government will give close consideration to the national security infrastructure that will cover Scotland's primary security requirements.

1182. This infrastructure will include the security and intelligence agencies of the state. The position of Scotland in relation to the UKUSA Agreement will have to be determined.

1183. The conceptualisation of national security must be sufficiently broad to include wider threats and challenges, including cybersecurity, biosecurity and climate security.

1184. The Republic must also ensure the integrity of its democracy, including from election interference, disinformation and related hybrid threats.

1185. Scotland should work closely with EU and NATO allies on democracy defence efforts, contributing what expertise it will have developed in this domain.

9E. Trade and Investment

1186. Trade and investment will be intrinsically linked to Scotland's future prosperity, as a small open economy. Return to the European Union will restore vital opportunities.

1187. In line with the Principles for European and External Relations, the Government will conduct a sustainable, ethical trade policy that reflects the values of the state.

1188. Scotland will participate in shaping EU trade policy, which will include the negotiation of trade agreements. It should support an approach exemplifying Union values.

1189. The Republic's trade policy orientation will relate to its economic, fiscal and industrial policies. It will frame the Scottish economy as it is presented to the outside world.

1190. The Government should intensify trade diversification and move exports definitively past the days of select familiar commodities into an era of export vibrancy.[67]

1191. The Scottish Trade Council will support trade and investment between Scotland and core and new markets in the EU, the United States and throughout the world.

1192. In those efforts, it will highlight the advantages of Scotland to European and external economic actors, including its legal system, English language and EU membership.

1193. The Scottish Diplomatic Network, designed with missions in nearly every European and international financial centre, will support Scotland's financial services sector.

1194. The STC will provide consistency for businesses, investors and other actors through the changes in the Transition and Foundation Phases, including currency transitions.

9F. Climate Change and Environment

1195. Climate change is unquestionably the single greatest challenge facing humanity and the planet. Scotland will face this challenge in a cooperative, all-society manner.

1196. The creation of the Counsellor of State for Climate Change and Response will indicate the seriousness of the Government's commitment to necessary and timely action.

1197. Outwith ministers, the Counsellor of State will be the Government's senior negotiator and representative in respect of climate change and connected matters.

1198. The Counsellor of State will ensure Scotland's strategic contributions to positive and effective responses to climate change in the EU and at multilateral institutions.

1199. In keeping with its long-standing practice, Scotland will advocate the protection and conservation of the environment, including biodiversity, at EU and global levels.

1200. The Republic should work actively, by building and leading alliance and partnerships, to drive forward EU environment policy and its connection to other Union policies.

1201. Scotland must continue to develop its own policies on climate change, sustainability and the environment, in accord with holistic alignment of internal and external action.

10. Diplomatic Strategy

1202. To become successful as a European and global actor, Scotland will need to unify all its foreign policy institutions through a coherent diplomatic strategy. It should design a Foundation Strategy for European and external relations. Scotland should access its untapped soft power and strengthen its links with the Scottish global diaspora. It should establish an institute to promote Scottish culture and society. Scotland could in future hold important leadership roles, including a seat on the UN Security Council.

1203. This Chapter analyses the basis of a **Foundation Strategy** for Scottish European and external relations, its **Strategy Elements**, Scotland's **Soft Power**, **Global Diaspora**, the concept of a Scottish **Cultural Institute** and **Leadership Roles** for Scotland.

10A. Foundation Strategy

1204. In exercising the foreign policy of a state, Scotland will require a diplomatic strategy, uniting all of the domains assessed in the Blueprint to further its values and interests.

1205. Establishing its European and External Relations Policies, Department of European and External Relations, Scottish European and External Relations Service, and the Scottish Diplomatic Network will be a transformational collective undertaking.

1206. It will be imperative that these new institutions are developed in a coordinated and purposeful manner, with a view to their interoperability and long-term functions.

1207. The Department's senior leadership must remain continually open to innovations and methods that will support the positive evolution of the organisation.

1208. Before moving from the Transition Phase into the Foundation Phase, Scotland should design a long-term strategy for its foreign policy institutions and their development.

1209. This **Foundation Strategy** should provide a robust vision for Scotland's European and external relations and its associated institutions for the entire Foundation Phase.

1210. It will therefore be a plan for the first decade of Scottish EU and external policies. It should be founded on the values of the Republic, its strategic national interests and the Principles for European and External Relations.

1211. This approach will be ambitious, but vital. Scotland must not spend the first 10 years after the point of independence just catching up to the rest of Europe and the world.

1212. Instead, Scotland should from the start build a dynamic and innovative European and global role. It should work diligently to make strategic contributions to European and international affairs, while also growing its institutions, reputation and influence.

1213. The Foundation Strategy should include major strategic objectives, supplemented by thematic focuses and sectoral priorities, integrating the EU and strategic partners.

1214. In coordinating its development, the Government should secure cross-party support for the strategy, so that it will be continuously implemented across the Foundation Phase, even after changes of government. The Parliament should be fully involved.

1215. The Chief Counsellor of State, Depute Chief Counsellor of State and other Counsellors of State should play leading roles in the design of the Foundation Strategy.

1216. As noted in the Blueprint, the Department will develop multiannual strategies, annual actions plans and business plans for itself, Directorates, Departmental Agencies and Diplomatic Missions. They must all align with the Foundation Strategy.

1217. The Government should maximise the potential of ACER and ACIA to provide expert advice and insight in support of the Foundation Strategy and related strategies.

1218. It should have regard to the strategies, programmes and innovations of EU Member States and other states for reflection and inspiration.

1219. The Government should evaluate the implementation of the Foundation Strategy at regular intervals to ensure the alignment of institutions and policies with its aims.

10B. Strategy Elements

1220. The Foundation Strategy will involve several interconnected **Strategy Elements**.

1221. The *European Union* will be a primary Strategy Element. Scotland's relationship with the Union and eventual membership will shape its internal and external relations.

1222. It is probable that Scotland will not become an EU Member State until around halfway through the Foundation Strategy. It should be constructed accordingly.

1223. The Republic should orient itself towards its future role in the Union from the earliest stage. In its pre-accession phase, it should align with EU foreign policy decisions.

1224. The Government should develop positions on major European foreign policy debates, including realistic and practical avenues for European strategic autonomy.

1225. *Multilateral Relations* will be another Strategy Element. Multilateralism and the global system will be foundational to Scotland's values, interests and outlook.

1226. Scotland will join principal international organisations, notably the United Nations. It should cultivate a reputation as a regular contributor to the UN and its programmes.

1227. The Republic will also participate in other organisations in furtherance of its values.

1228. *Bilateral Relations* will be another Strategy Element. Partnerships with other states, based on common ground and shared values, will be beneficial to the Republic.

1229. Scotland will build ever closer relations with EU Member States and forge a strategic partnership with the US. It will work with global partners such as Canada and Norway.

1230. It will deploy all the elements of diplomacy in its bilateral relations, including political dialogues, treaties, State Visits, exchanges and common endeavours.

1231. The Government should facilitate **Annual Bilateral Conferences** with partner states, gathering diverse groups of stakeholders for informal dialogue and networking.

1232. It should conduct **Strategic Bilateral Audits** (SBAs) to survey avenues for promoting connections, facilitating collaboration and driving forward bilateral relationships.

1233. The Foundation Strategy should also give consideration to the concept of a **Scotland National Team** – the collective European and global presence of all Scottish actors.

10C. Soft Power

1234. Scotland is fortunate to be rich in sources of soft power, many of which are unused. It should channel its soft power potential to advance its values and interests.

1235. The Republic should cultivate global soft power profiles in particular areas for which it will make meaningful contributions to human progress and society.

1236. In this regard, it should note that it will often share the same space with states such as Norway, Canada, Sweden, Ireland and Finland. It can seek to cooperate with them.

1237. The Government should set a **Soft Power Strategy** which operationalises Scotland's soft power attributes and which aligns with the Foundation Strategy.

1238. The strategic role of the President as an authoritative and respected voice in the rest of Europe and the world should be fully appreciated and deployed where appropriate.

1239. The state should ensure that its soft power is utilised effectively to support its people. The borrowing of Scottish soft power by external actors is not useful to the public.

1240. Scotland should pioneer a principle of **Soft Power for Public Good**, a commitment by the Government to deploy soft power actively for the benefit of the public.

1241. It can marshal particular dates in the calendar to create annual points of interest and engagement. For Scotland, the most important day in this respect is St Andrew's Day.

1242. The objective will be to convert sentiment into substance, through taking a moment of celebration of Scottish culture and building in layers of policies and connections.

1243. It can contribute to an informative global media landscape. News and current affairs from Scotland's **Public Media Organisation** should be available free worldwide.

1244. This service will connect European and international audiences to Scottish journalism and Scottish perspectives on a wide range of salient news themes.

1245. The Government and the Republic should consider their design and presentation. The global success of the Canada wordmark could be an instructive guide for Scotland.[68]

10D. Global Diaspora

1246. Millions of people around the world identify as Scottish. The Scottish global diaspora is an invaluable network of connections for Scotland.[69]

1247. Scotland can gain significantly from this collective network for the benefit of its goals in Europe and the world. It should consider in turn how it can support the diaspora.

1248. The Government should set a **Diaspora Strategy** which defines the diaspora broadly, focuses on building links with it and aligns with the Foundation Strategy.

1249. Scotland's diaspora should be welcoming and inclusive, open to all with an interest in or affinity for Scotland, and reflective of the values of the Republic.

1250. While Scottish communities exist around the world, some of the larger elements will be found in particular locations, such as in parts of Canada and the United States.

1251. The Department should undertake mapping on a continual basis of Scottish diaspora communities and individuals, through the Directorate for Global Cooperation.

1252. It should foster their integration with Scotland through educational, cultural, sport and other exchanges, in partnership with civil society organisations.

10E. Cultural Institute

1253. As part of its worldwide engagement, the Government should consider establishing a **Scottish Cultural Institute** (SCI) to promote Scottish culture, society and values.

1254. Its purpose would be to connect individuals and communities in the rest of Europe and the world to modern Scotland in its many facets and rich diversity.

1255. While some elements of Scottish culture and society are prominent worldwide, it is arguable that many are not. Scotland has often been aggregated with the former UK.

1256. A Scottish national cultural institute would therefore have significant merit. Branches could be co-located in Scottish diplomatic missions or placed adjacent to them.

1257. The SCI should also have an active presence in Scotland, so that it will function as an interchange in both directions, not simply a means of Scottish 'projection' abroad.

1258. The future name of the SCI should be determined after public consultation. Its design and objectives should align with the Foundation Strategy.

10F. Leadership Roles

1259. European and global leadership roles will provide opportunities for Scotland to shape institutions, build its profile and make concrete progress on important matters.

1260. They can constitute rare opportunities to secure guaranteed attention and interest from other states, international organisations and wider actors.

1261. Within the European Union, the most visible leadership role for the Member States is the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

1262. As noted in *Scotland's EU Blueprint*, the Republic could potentially hold its inaugural EU Council presidency within 5-15 years of its accession to the Union.[70]

1263. The Council presidency, lasting six months, is therefore an infrequent responsibility, through which Scotland can showcase its good management and vision for the Union.

1264. In multilateral organisations, other rotating roles include the Chairpersonship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and Chairpersonship of the OSCE.

1265. The most noted and prestigious international leadership role is a place on the United Nations Security Council. Scotland could compete for a non-permanent seat.

1266. At the UN, Scotland would be part of the Western European and Others Group, which is allocated two non-permanent seats – currently held by Ireland and Norway.[71]

1267. Before considering a candidature, Scotland would first have to build its reputation at the UN, by working constructively, forging partnerships and achieving successes.[72]

1268. Securing a broad coalition of support from Member States from around the world will be necessary to be successful in an eventual campaign and vote.

1269. Candidatures are announced years in advance. Scotland might expect to work for 10-15 years, perhaps 10-20 years, from announcement of interest to potential victory.

1270. Scottish cross-party and inter-government support, based on a candidature strategy, would be essential across that time horizon, as would be the support of EU members.

1271. Should it succeed in a future campaign, Scotland would have an exceptional two-year opportunity to bring its voice to the Council to shape international relations for better.

Conclusions

1272. Constructing the foreign policy architecture of an independent Scottish state would require purpose, investment, dedication and innovation. This Blueprint demonstrates decisively that such an endeavour is eminently feasible, with the appropriate design.

1273. As a member, the European Union would be part of Scotland's constitutional identity. It would shape every aspect of Scottish politics and government. The only viable path is for Scotland to be a positive and wholehearted EU Member State. The distinction between European relations and external relations cannot be overemphasised.

1274. It follows that membership of the Union would be central to Scotland's foreign policy. The Scottish state should always be guided by its values. Scotland should craft a holistic, values-based foreign policy that reflects its values and interests and ensures the harmonious alignment of the internal and external action of the state.

1275. The Principles for European and External Relations set out in this Blueprint represent the tenets of such an approach. Scotland would wholly invest in European integration and pursue its European relations accordingly. It would conduct its external relations by upholding multilateralism, international law and the rules-based global system.

1276. Scotland would support the United Nations. It would forge bilateral relationships with states of the world. Its fellow EU Member States would always be Scotland's closest partners. Scotland would seek a strategic partnership with the United States, cordial relations with China and a constructive relationship with the United Kingdom.

1277. To further its European and external priorities, Scotland would build a global network of diplomatic missions. The proposal in this Blueprint is for an ambitious and strategic configuration that would facilitate Scotland's European and global role. The footprint would include an embassy in all EU members and investments in the US and Canada.

1278. As a European small state, Scotland has the opportunity and impetus to be innovative in its institutions. The Counsellors of State, as senior advisers and representatives, would strategically foster Scotland's global profile. The Department of European and External Relations, as a modern and vibrant organisation, would deliver its objectives.

1279. This Blueprint reveals the connection between institutions for European and external relations and those of the wider Scottish state. As a republic, the Constitution would define the separation of powers. Parliamentary confirmation of state representatives would depart from the Westminster system and establish a greater balance.

1280. Through its comprehensive assessment of an independent Scotland's foreign policy institutions, this Blueprint provides a new foundation for discussion. It supports the more thoughtful Scottish debate on EU and international affairs now demanded.

Scotland's Principles for European and External Relations

Republic of Scotland

Principles for European Relations

1. Scotland believes in the shared values of our Union and the European ideal of building a more peaceful, prosperous and free Europe
2. Membership of our Union is in Scotland's strategic national interests and the means of achieving a better Scotland in a united Europe
3. European affairs are not foreign policy. The EU is part of the government of Scotland, shared with our fellow Member States
4. Scotland will be a positive Member State which participates in all our common institutions and contributes actively to the future of Europe
5. Scotland will work constructively in European partnership to address the internal and external challenges facing our Union
6. Scotland will promote democracy in our Union and the progressive involvement of citizens in decision-making at all levels
7. Scotland will seek ever closer relations with our fellow Member States, through the institutions of our Union and in direct cooperation
8. Scotland believes that our Union is a force for good in the world and that our collective global voice should become progressively united

Republic of Scotland

Principles for External Relations

1. Scotland will represent itself externally based on our values and interests together and conduct a values-based foreign policy
2. Scotland will strive for a world of peace, freedom, security and prosperity, in which every individual has the opportunity to achieve their potential
3. Scotland will support the advancement of multilateral organisations, in particular the United Nations, through constructive engagement
4. Scotland will uphold international law and an equitable, rules-based global system, leading by example in fulfilling our own legal obligations
5. Scotland will work cooperatively with other states of the world wherever possible, on the basis of common ground and shared values
6. Scotland will advocate an EU foreign policy which is coherent, effective, and united, promoting the values and positions of our Union in the world
7. Scotland will contribute to international development based on principles of partnership, co-creation, solidarity and friendship
8. Scotland recognises that our external credibility depends on our policies and actions at home, and that we must hold ourselves to high standards

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